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3Abstract 
This PhD by practice sets out to reformulate the meeting between photographer and subject, 
from one that is commonly constructed as a power relationship to an empathic meeting between 
subjectivities. It is an attempt to re-engage with the original promise of photography –that of 
connecting with the ‘soul’ of the other. I take a phenomenological perspective, applying recent 
research in the field of neuroscience and psychology to throw new light on processes at play, both 
when we view photographically reproduced human faces and when we come face to face with 
others in the meeting preceding photographic portraits. My original contribution to knowledge 
consists of beginning to construct a theory as to why certain photographic portraits invoke an 
embodied reaction, whilst others leave us cold. What is it that makes us look again and again 
at particular photographic portraits? I propose that emotional contagion is an important factor 
both when making and viewing photograpic portraiture. It was not within the scope of this 
thesis by practice to explore this proposition, but it is an area suitable for further research.
I use the practice as a testing ground, letting each new step develop out of my reflections on the 
previous work, using a qualitative methodology. I approach the face-to-face meeting through the 
writing of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and phenomenology, and make a series of experimentations, 
letting the practice twist and turn upon itself. I strip away and interchange the components of the 
photographic portrait one by one, project by project, letting my practice respond experimentally 
to both the theoretical research and the situation in which it is conceived. I move from still to 
moving and back again, through performance, text and sound, in an attempt to find that elusive 
embodied connection between subject matter and audience. 
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7Preface – A Practice Between Myself and Others
Right from the beginning, my engagement with photography was an extension of my interest in 
the faces that surrounded me. As a child I drew friends and family, but never quite managed to 
do them justice. After high school, I bought a camera in a flea market and a few weeks later got 
to try out as a photographer's assistant. The shoot in question was a portrait during a press-event, 
and the photographer asked me to please help make the subject feel comfortable so he would get 
a good shot. Something in that meeting suited me, made my natural shyness abate. I got the job, 
and started working with photography.
After graduating from my BA-course in photography, I started working as a photographer, 
combining editorial portrait commissions with self-instigated documentary portraiture projects. 
I photographed actors, musicians, politicians, members of diﬀerent subcultures and plenty of 
others who for one reason or another were deemed interesting for the public at that particular 
moment in time. But being one of a line of portrait photographers during press junkets did not 
suit me, and navigating the contrasting demands of picture editors and PR representatives made 
the meetings feel predefined, empty and flat. I started focussing on my own, personal work, 
influenced by photographers like Diane Arbus and Nan Goldin. I believed, inspired by their 
works and lives, that I needed to immerse myself in the environment of the people I wanted to 
depict, that I needed to become their friend, their confidante. I sought, like Arbus, to capture 
those moments when the mask slips, when people reveal something they don’t want to. I fell prey 
to the idea that, if people don’t want to reveal something, it must by virtue of this say more about 
them, and be more true. More interesting.
But working in this vein came to a dead end. I discovered I am not interested in catching people 
out – revealing something they themselves do not want to be seen. Ethically, I could not justify 
8it as a working method, regardless of the level of success the end result might garner. Instead, I 
reformulated my approach to the genre, and posited that I wanted to capture precisely the masks 
people wear while inhabiting public space, the faces people choose to present. Thinking the mask 
is all you got, I embraced a postmodern perspective, seeing people as “made by soft plastic, 
moulded by social circumstance.”1 It is at this point that this research project begins. I set out in 
this PhD to investigate the unequal power relationship between photographer and subject, and 
how it aﬀects the resulting image.2 But, through an engagement with the prose poems of Charles 
Baudelaire and my own writings, I felt the need to reformulate what I do yet again. It is not 
portraits that make a power relationship manifest that interest me. Not roles played nor masks 
worn in public. Rather, it is the moments when one manages, despite roles and masks, despite 
rules governing one’s behaviour in public, to feel the boundaries between self and other dissolve. 
When we, suddenly, become unsure of the demarcation line between inside and outside, what is 
seen and what is felt.
A portrait of an inmate of Tuol Sleng prison, Cambodia. Of a slave at a 19th-century plantation. 
The work of August Sander. Of Rineke Djikstra. The Scottish family portrayed by Thomas 
Struth. I return again and again, and I never tire of meeting the eyes of the depicted persons. 
What is it that happens in me when I encounter these images? And how can I similarly move 
my audience through another’s subjectivity? Rather than eﬀecting a close reading of these works, 
which has been done many times before by others,3 I turn my gaze outwards to find answers. 
I will look towards neuroscience and psychology, attempting to draw out the dynamics in the 
dyadic meeting between photographer and subject, artwork and viewer.
In the first practice project, Returns, I encounter white middle-aged men on the train platforms 
of Paris Les Halles station as they are travelling home from work, setting up a large-format 
camera as a temporary stage within the public space. In the next work, A Place to Call Home, 
1. Kenneth Gergen, “The healthy, happy human being wears many masks” in The Fontana
Postmodernism Reader ed. Walter Truett  Anderson, (London: Fontana Press 1995), 138.
2. See Tagg 1993, 2009 and  Sekula 1986 for discussions on the processes and power relations at play, when to be 
portrayed shifted from being a sign of power and prestige,  to demanding subjection and submissivness, and pho-
tography became intrinsically linked with surveillance, recordkeeping, evidence and truth. 
3.  See Sobieszek 1999; Fried 2008; Dugan 2014. 
9created during a residency in Israel, I continue creating work through encounters with strangers 
inhabiting public space. This time my subjects are more democratic, as I attempt to investigate 
their role in Israeli society. Are they heroes? Victims? Or even perpetrators? I create a series of 
portraits, but also make a film based on my written notes from these encounters. 
Writing moments I would have liked to photograph, but was unable to, becomes a process 
of defining precisely when the urge to create arises. As James Joyce’s epiphanies or Charles 
Baudelaire’s prose poems sought to do, I record small, ephemeral perceptions of real life that seem 
to take on heightened significance, standing out from the mass of experiences of our everyday 
lives. I attempt to rework one such moment into a short video loop, Breathing Space, where the 
laboured breathing of a tuba player through his instrument evokes my own bodily struggles with 
asthma. Next, I invite a group of people into the studio to explore what happens if I remove the 
lens mediating the encounter, instead letting the audience meet the subjects face to face in the 
performance Det Ordnar Sig Nog.
Finally, in Merciful, Wonderful, I let the video work culminate in the frame being filled for a 
duration of time by an older man’s face, reaching out towards the audience with his humanity.
 
Interweaving theory and practice, reflection, writing and making, I explore what happens when 
we connect with others in face-to-face meetings, and how this linking of subjectivities can be 
carried across to the meeting between artwork and audience. The text is punctured by personal 
reflections and journal excerpts in italics. 
I want to express something of my diﬃculties here, right from the start. It’s no 
coincidence I became a photographer. For as long as I can remember, I have 
observed and reflected on the world around me. First through drawing, then the 
camera. But whatever I made remained for me only, and I carefully hid away all 
my sketchbooks in drawers. When I applied to my first art college, I couldn’t bear 
the idea of attending an interview, instead sending oﬀ an envelope full of slides. I 
was accepted, and spent all summer in my bathroom-darkroom nervously trying to 
prepare the portfolio I had been instructed to bring on the first day of the course. 
When I arrived, I was petrified. I stepped into a room full of people surrounding 
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tables carrying portfolios. I placed mine in a corner, and then promptly moved 
to the other end of the room; I wanted no one to connect me with my set of 
photographs, portraits, in the black cardboard box, even though I knew that the 
images were not worthless, and some even good. After some time, I got more used 
to sharing my work, even though the process remained painful. Perhaps I need to 
articulate some of the anguish accompanying this process of turning the focus onto 
myself and my work that a PhD by practice entails. To refrain from refracting the 
attention towards another, and fight the strong desire to remain private, secretive, 
ensconced in my own world. Behind my camera, invisible. 
I am watching a documentary on Vivian Maier, a French–American nanny who, 
when defaulting on payments for her storage lockers in old age, was discovered to 
be not only a prolific but also a talented photographer. As her work has become 
exhibited and sold, writers and critics keep coming back to the enigma – but why 
did she choose not to show anyone? Why did she work as a nanny? Well-known 
photographer Joel Meyerowitz said that she seemed to lack a certain something in 
her character that would make her want to defend herself as an artist to the outside 
world.4 Perhaps I too lack that certain something. It does not come naturally to 
me, this proclaiming about my position, about that of my artworks. It has nothing 
to do with thinking, making, or even writing. Instead, it is rooted in a deep 
impulse to remain hidden. But, in the pages that unfold I will force myself out of 
the shadows. Try not to feel blinded by the searing light in this central space, but 
to remain functioning, reflecting and expressing throughout. And I imagine you, 
dear audience, wishing me luck in my endeavour. 
4.  Finding Vivian Maier, directed by John Maloof and Charlie Siskel (2013; Chicago, IFC Films), DVD.
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1. Introduction, or The Quest to Capture the Contained  
When he was ordered to sit for a portrait, the 3rd-century philosopher Plotinus said, “Is it 
not enough to carry about this image in which nature has enclosed us? Do you really think I 
must also consent to leave, as a desirable spectacle to posterity, an image of an image?”5 I am 
interested in the human face as the surface through which we attempt to make sense of other 
humans. This PhD explores the dynamics involved in the meeting between artist and subject, 
with particular focus on face-to-face interaction. Building on both my artistic practice and on 
current research, I discuss the forces at work in the meeting between photographer and subject, 
through the presentation of an original body of work and this thesis. I map out the relationship 
between portraiture and empathy, both in the relationship between photographer and subject, 
and between the photographically reproduced human face and the viewer.
My aim is to reformulate the meeting between photographer and subject, from one that is 
commonly constructed as a power relationship6 to one viewed as an empathic meeting between 
subjectivities. I use recent findings in the field of neuroscience to throw new light on the processes 
at play, both when we view photographically reproduced human faces and when we come face to 
face with others in the taking of the photographs.
During the last decade a significant number of publications and exhibitions on photography, 
in Britain and elsewhere, have taken The Face as their theme. The majority have focused on the 
photographic print’s ability/inability to comment on the character or psychological state of the 
individual depicted. The nature of the photographic portrait as an intersubjective construct has 
been neglected in favour of conceptual approaches, like the rigid procedures of artists such as 
Thomas Ruﬀ, Bettina von Zwehli or Marjaana Kella. These artists have all been influenced by the 
postmodern distrust of a fixed identity, there to be photographed and uncovered by the artist. 
Rather than attempting to depict anything pertaining to personality 
or interior life, they set up rigidly defined rules (for instance, photographing subjects listening 
5.  St Jerome, ‘Letters 54’, quoted in Robert Sobieszek, Ghost in the Shell, Photography and the Human Soul 1850-
2000 (LA and Cambridge: Los Angeles County Museum of Arts, 1999), 16.
6.  See page 9, and Brilliant 1991, Clarke 1992, Bolton, 1989, Durden et al 2001 for discussions about the power 
relationship between subject and photographer during the making of photographic portraits. 
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to classical music in the dark, suddenly interrupted by a flash; people under hypnosis; or people 
lit with flat lighting and whose countenances are totally devoid of expression). No major study 
has explored the interpersonal empathic meeting preceding the photographic portrait. My 
research will therefore add a new, necessary perspective to the contemporary debate regarding 
photographic portraiture. But this project is not a throwback to ideas that the photograph 
demonstrates “artistic originality through consolidating the self of the portrayed".7 Rather, it is 
an attempt to argue against those who decry the bankruptcy of portraiture, and, instead, reinvest 
it with the possibility of achieving a deep connection with the other. 
The main task of the photographer has often been formulated in terms of preventing the sitter 
from acting in front of the camera. Richard Brilliant claims, in accordance with Plotinus, that a 
portrait “challenges the transience or irrelevancy of human existence and the portrait artist must 
respond to the demands formulated by the individual’s wish to endure.”8 This PhD, however, will 
not address questions relating to authenticity and staging. Instead, I will use phenomenology as a 
theoretical framework in which to reframe the photographer–sitter meeting, and recent advances 
within empathy research, to throw new light on the dynamics present. 
The methods used within the practice of making and writing are empirically driven, but the 
research comes into being in reference to existing bodies of knowledge in diverse fields. Theory 
and practice have informed each other, creating a synaesthesia between making and reading, 
thinking and writing, where the practice can be read as a series of propositions on how one 
can engender an empathic connection to the other. My method draws from phenomenology, 
psychology and neuroscience and in particular the emerging field of neuroaesthetics. 
The nature of empathy, emotional contagion and embodied interaction is slippery. My method 
is therefore necessarily fragmented, convoluted and diﬃcult to pin down on a single concise 
track. This is reflected in the structure of this thesis, which moves from page to page, perspective 
to perspective, in a looping movement, returning again and again to the portrait through the 
refracted lens of my readings, making and thinking through portraiture. Thinking through 
7.   Benedict Burbridge, “Exacting Photography: Self-Imaging and Its Frustration in Contemporary Art Photography, 
Re.bus, no. 5 (summer 2010), 2.
8.  Richard Brilliant Portraiture  (London: Reaktion Books, 1991), 14.
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making engenders a diﬀerent form of knowledge from the practice of reading and looking at 
finished artworks. Therefore, theory and practice underpin each other like a latticework, where 
each strand is equally necessary for arriving at an understanding of photographic portraiture.
I will give a background to photographic portraiture and the diﬀerent dynamics at play in the 
meeting preceding the photographic portrait. Second, I will describe my attempts at recording 
moments of embodied connection through writing and practice. Third, and most importantly, I 
will look at recent empathy research within neuroscience, neuroaesthetics and psychology.
Fourth, I will draw out the relationship between research and practice, and challenge the thinking 
around both. Interspersed within the text, descriptions of my encounters with artworks appear as 
I attempt to define moments of connectivity.
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2. Framing Photographic Portraiture 
When discussing portrait photography, it is useful to look at the influence ideas about 
physiognomy have had on thoughts on the face. Physiognomy is the so-called science of reading 
character from the facial traits, the size and shape of the features and the form and proportion 
of the skull. It is concerned with permanent traits rather than shifting expressions – an excess of 
expression was thought to erase the physiognomy.9
Faces are arguably the most viewed item of our lives,10 and the idea of the face as a reflection of 
the soul has existed since antiquity. St Jerome, in the 5th century, writes, “the face is the mirror 
of the mind, and eyes without speaking confess the secrets of the heart”.11 The modern form of 
physiognomy was founded by Johann Caspar Lavater, a Swiss scientist and priest, who, in 1778, 
published Physiognomishe Fragmente. Here, he outlined how to interpret and judge facial traits 
in the search for the character and moral state of the subject. With the advent of photography, 
physiognomy acquired the perfect tool to aid the reading of a face in the portrait photograph.12
People were also inclined to believe, through the camera’s ability to make the familiar strange, 
that the photographic portrait inherently contained the truth of the character of the sitter.13 
Photography became a way for people to gain access to what they saw as their real, true 
appearance. It is important to bear in mind that in the early days of photography mirrors were 
not so widespread as they were to become in the 20th century.14 
Mental patients and criminals were two of the groups that would be extensively photographed 
and analysed by scientists with physiognomic pretensions.15 However, physiognomic theories 
spread outside of this scientific realm to influence both studio photographers and artists who 
9.  Stephen Bann, "Erased Physiognomy: Téeodore Géricault, Paul Strand and Garry Winogrand" in ed. Graham 
Clarke, The Portrait in Photography, (London: Reaktion Books ,1992), 43.
10.  See for instance, Adophs and Janowski, p. 253.
11.  St Jerome, quoted in Robert Sobieszek, Ghost in the Shell, Photography and the Human Soul 1850-2000, (LA and 
Cambridge: Los Angeles County Museum of Arts, 1999), 16. 
12.  Graham Clarke, The Portrait in Photography, (London: Reaktion Books ,1992), 14.
13.  Mette Mortensen, "Photography in the Public Arena" in Geometry of the Face, exhibition catalogue. 
(Copenhagen, Denmark: The National Museum of Photography, The Royal Library, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2003), 
22.
14.  Ibid., 22.
15.   Suzanne Regener, "Reading Faces – Photography and the Search for Expression" in Geometry of the Face, exh. 
cat. (Copenhagen, Denmark: The National Museum of Photography, The Royal Library, 2003), 43.
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were aiming to capture the “unique, characteristic expression that provides a link between the 
internal and the external”.16 James F. Ryder claimed that his camera could “read and prove 
character in a man’s face at sight. To his (the camera’s) eye a rouge was a rouge; the honest man, 
when found, was recognized and properly estimated”.17 These ideas and beliefs continued to 
influence photographic practitioners in the first half of the 20th century. August Sander, for 
example, although more interested in using people as representatives of a type or a profession 
than he was in his sitters as individuals, thought that photography had the ability to “create 
pictures that reproduce the people concerned with unconditional veracity and reflect their whole 
psychology”.18 Edward Weston continued this argument in the 1940s, claiming that the main 
role of photographers is to “reveal the individual before his camera, to transfer the living quality 
of that individual to his finished print.”19 Hence, for Weston and Sander, a portrait, regardless 
of media, needed to express the personality or truth of the sitter, and could only be judged by its 
ability to do so, rather than from aesthetic considerations.
The influence of physiognomy is still felt today.20 One reason that these ideas remain popular 
might be that we do derive some accurate idea of a person’s personality from facial expressions, if 
not from the static features. Expressions reflect our state of mind, and are changeable. Our static 
features, in contrast, are not malleable. An example that comes to mind is that of two portraits 
a friend sent me. They both depict the same man, but one of the images is from Thomas Ruﬀ’s 
famous Portraits series. Devoid of expression, the face that looks out at me resembles a mask, and, 
as I meet the gaze of the depicted man, I am left cold. I feel nothing but a detached curiosity. 
Thomas Ruﬀ has said that he wanted to remind the viewer that they are not meeting a real person 
but a photograph.21 In the next image the man’s countenance fills the frame, and he 
looks at me with eyes that seem to communicate something. The skin around his eyes is slightly 
crinkled, he tilts his head upwards and juts out his chin. The beginnings of a smile seem to be 
playing around the corners of his mouth. I look at his somewhat deformed nose, his battered 
skin, and I imagine a life for him. Yes, perhaps I don’t diﬀerentiate so much between meeting 
him in real life and meeting him here, on the page . 
16.  Ibid., 47.
17.  Sobiezseck, 63.
18.   August Sander, Menchen des 20 Jahrhunderts, quoted in Regener, 52.
19.  Mick Gidley, Hoppé’s Impure Portraits, in Clarke, 137.
20.   Recent titles include Physiognomy, the Art of Reading Faces by J. Lefas, Face Language by R. L. Whiteside, and 
Face Reading, the Art of Chinese Physiognomy by T. T. Mar.
21.  Gill Blank, and Thomas Ruﬀ, “Gil Blank and Thomas Ruﬀ in Conversation.” Influence, no. 2 (2004), 52.
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Fig I    
Similarly, a popular idea today is that our appearance is how we define who we are. Portrait 
photography reinforces this assumed connection between identity and appearance, the 
connection that we all use to guide us around the public arena. Even if we really know better, it 
is very diﬃcult for us not to judge people we meet on their appearance. We are acutely aware that 
we are being judged on our exteriors, as the increasing popularity of plastic surgery can testify.22 
In recent contemporary art, the idea of consolidating the self of the sitter through the skill of 
the artist/photographer has gone thoroughly out of fashion. At a scientific and artistic level these 
ideas became intrinsically linked with prevalent ideologies of racial superiority in the 1930s and 
thus became thoroughly discredited after the Second World War.23 An example of the current
view within contemporary photography on physiognomy and portraiture is found in the foreword 
0of the catalogue, About Face, from an exhibition at the Hayward Gallery. The term ‘portrait 
photographer’ is eschewed in favour of the term ‘face photographer’ as a way to disassociate 
from the “historical baggage”24 carried by the term portraiture. The catalogue outlines two of 
Fig I     Left :Thomas Ruﬀ. Porträt (J. Röing). 1988. 
            Right:  Johan Röing, private image
22.   Cooter, Amy. “UK Cosmetic Surgery Statistics 2013: Which Are the Most Popular,” February 3, 2014. http://
www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/feb/03/uk-plastic-surgery-2013-most-popular.
23.  Regener, 52.
24.  William A. Ewing, "The Faces In the Mirror"  in About Face, Photography and the Death of the Portrait, 
exhibition catalouge, (London: Hayward Gallery Publishing, 2004), 6.
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the primary issues uniting participating artists: the rejection of the idea that a portrait can make 
visible the character or personality of the subject and a refusal to believe that a photograph can 
capture the “likeness”25 of a face in all its transmutations. 
While I don’t believe that a photograph can capture the ‘soul’ of the subject, I do not agree with 
this complete rejection of the significance of the face in our understanding of the other through 
an image. The face does hold a special place for humans.26 Even if the camera is only capable 
of capturing one of the infinite numbers of transmutations our faces are capable of, this one 
image will communicate something very diﬀerent in level and extent from what a photograph of 
another body part would be able to achieve. I believe the face is qualitatively and quantitatively 
more eﬀective in communication than other body parts. By virtue of this it must be allowed a 
special place.
As well as reasons intrinsic to the properties of the face, photographic representations of faces 
are particularly significant because they take place within a history of artistic representations of 
faces, a discourse of facial images in drawing, painting, sculpture and photography. The practice 
of creating and looking at representations of faces is in itself an act that gives meaning. 27
I think back to my own compulsion to photograph the faces of others. How does that fit 
into a desire to remain hidden? Does it reflect a feeling of alienation, where that which is 
meant to be close and familiar to the small child always felt worryingly strange. As if one 
did not belong there. Can one find a sense of belonging in the faces of others, instead? Or is 
it simply a mutual recognition of something, each other, as fellow humans? (But it can also 
happen with animals – so I would say a recognition of another lived life is more correct.) 
Is there a kind of solace to be found in those quick meetings between strangers – those 
mutual looks? A solace unsullied by misunderstandings, accusations or misinterpretations? 
Quickly walking away, but with the photograph as proof. 
25.  Ewing, 9.
26.  See Ewing, and his claim that “the face is part of the body, not of a higher order, not sacred where the body is 
profane,”  10.
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It did happen, that moment of connection. I cannot possibly know what drove Vivian 
Maier to roam the streets with her camera. 
But looking at her work I wonder if she too did not find solace in the faces of strangers. 
2.1 On the Face
Despite the change in trends in thoughts on the face today compared to the 19th century, the 
face is still the primary site where investigations into our identities and emotions, desires and 
character take place. We perceive expression and individuality even in the most clumsily drawn 
sketch of a face.28 The face is the principal tool of communication between humans, a “membrane 
of encounter”29 of the self, the other and the world. In order to further my understanding of 
the relationship between photographer and subject, I will be looking at some diﬀering thoughts 
regarding the meeting between faces, thus examining what a face is, and what it emanates.
Attitudes to the face have unsurprisingly followed shifts in critical theory and philosophy, with 
more recent critics doubting the existence of a locatable truth within it. Instead, they have indulged 
deconstructionist theories with ideas of play and slippage of what the face means. Thoughts can 
be divided into two main schools, the first believing the face to be “a fluid matrix of constantly 
shifting identities at once true and false, assumed and genuine, feigned and imagined.”30 In 
this context the face is regarded as an “organ-carrying plate of nerves”31, constantly moving, 
expressing miniscule muscular movements that the rest of the body normally conceals. It is a 
site of struggle between what we are feeling and what we would like those around us to see. The 
novelist Kobo Abe suggests that the expression of the face acts like a “roadmap between oneself 
and others.”32 
28.  Ernst H. Gombrich, The Image and the Eye: Further Studies in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation. (Oxford: 
Phaidon Press Ltd, 1986), 115.
29.  Anne Krauter, "Pictures Many – Original (N)one? Aspects of the Portrait Today", in ed. Peter Pakesch, Abbild: 
Recent Portraiture and Depiction, (New York: Springer, 2001) 17.
30.  Sobiezseck, 86.
31.  Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 1986), 88.
32.  Kobo Abe, The Face of Another, (New York: Vintage, 2003), 27.
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There is a duality in that the face can only show as much as it hides, and hide as much as it shows. 
Emmanuel Levinas, on the other hand, writes about the meeting of two faces as a site of nakedness, 
defencelessness. The other, when facing, exposes what is “most naked, most vulnerable.”33 This 
facing the other can also make demands. His presence makes a summons, requesting a response. 
The other is demanding a reproduction of his postures and gestures, “ordering my body with 
his.”34 
I think about the portrait of a woman and a baby from the Cambodian Tuol Sleng 
genocide museum. The pair were photographed as they were brought into the notorious 
Khmer Rouge prison that only seven people are known to have survived. The photographer, 
sent by the regime to China as a young teenager to learn the photographic craft, formed 
part of the prison guard. He knew that if he were to make one or two mistakes, he, too, 
would be executed. Did this mean he felt empathy for the woman sitting in front of the 
camera? Or had he become numb to the suﬀering all around? We cannot know anything 
about his feelings, yet, when I look at the woman’s face, something happens in me. I 
believe I can feel her sadness, her resignation to her fate and the fate of the young baby 
in her arms. I wish I could help her, wish I could at least entertain hope that she and the 
baby survived. I feel as if they speak to me through the portrait. Requesting a response in 
me, as Levinas has described the face-to-face meeting. Does it matter that we cannot know 
if the photographer felt empathy or not? 
As Alphonso Lingis puts it in his response to Levinas’s thoughts:
The I arises wholly in response to the other. It is with oneself that one is summoned to 
respond … One begins by consenting to talk, just to pass the time – talk is cheap – and little by little one 
finds that one has given everything away. 35
Here, Lingis summarizes the dynamics also occurring in the meeting between photographer and 
photographed, and the perils inherent in such an interchange. Despite this sense of risk there is 
a purity in how Levinas views the encounter. Rather than looking at skin as a covering he sees it 
as a zone of exposure, where our vulnerability is made manifest. 
33.  E Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, (Springer Science & Business Media1979), 127.
34.  Alphonso Lingis, Deathbound Subjectivity (Bloomington: Indiana Univ Pr, 1989), 144.
35.  Ibid., 146.
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This enables us to look beyond socially allocated identities and uniforms.36
In disagreement with the aforementioned school, the second school of thought sees the face 
as a “blank somatic surface expressive of absolutely nothing yet infinitely suggestive.”37  Gilles 
Deleuze and Feliz Guattari claim that the face cannot be defined as a type of “envelope exterior”38 
to the person. Rather, it is an intersection between significance and subjectification: a white wall 
where signs can play, with black holes where consciousness and passion are hiding. The face, 
then, is a screen that meaning can reflect oﬀ, fluid in construction and constantly changing.39 
Faces are put on and altered in accordance with the role to be played. “You don’t so much 
have a face as slide into one.”40 You are judged on the face you produce, always at risk of being 
rejected if your face is diﬀerent, or seems suspect. The faces of the protagonists in various power 
relationships will conform to the social conventions in place rather than taking on their own 
individuality. This contrasts with Levinas’s idea of the face as something that can transplant us 
away from the role and predetermined exchange. I believe that, even if meetings have a tendency 
to follow social conventions, there is nonetheless a space where the humanity of the other can 
and will slip through. 
In a clip from Hungarian director Béla Tarr’s film Werckmeister Harmonies, a mob 
of men armed with wooden sticks can be seen entering a hospital, moving systematically 
from room to room in a silent choreography, turning the sick out of their beds, hitting and 
kicking them, destroying furniture and emptying cupboards. The only sound to be heard 
is shoes against floor, and the muﬄed sounds of bodies being beaten and furniture turned 
over. The victims as well as the perpetrators are eerily silent. A Steadicam camera floats 
behind the running men, tracking their progress through the building. After five minutes 
of steady progression through the building, the two lead characters walk through a room 
being destroyed, and at the end of it pull down a white curtain covering a doorway 
leading into the next space. They suddenly stop on the threshold, looking. 
36.  Levinas, 132.
37.  Sobieszek, 86.
38.  Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Translated by Brian 
Massumi, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 168.
39.  Ibid., 115.
40.  Ibid., 176.
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The camera floats in-between them and also come to a stop, and we get to see what they 
see – an unbearably old and fragile-looking man standing naked on spindly legs in a 
dilapidated bathtub. His head hangs, shoulders are hunched and arms and legs look as 
if they would snap in an instant. The camera – and the men – stand still for a moment 
as music can be heard on the soundtrack, then turn their backs and start walking away. 
From room after room along the long central corridor, the other members of the mob file 
wordlessly out behind their leaders. Violence, when faced with the fragile humanity of 
the old man, is impossible. He reminds us of where we will all end up, and where we all 
started – as vulnerable helpless creatures dependent on the good intentions of others.41 
 
Giorgio Agamben defines the face as “the very opening in which humans hide and stay 
hidden.”42  It shows all the characteristics of a person, without those attributes managing to tell 
us anything about who that being is. For Agamben, what the face reveals is just the possibility 
of communication. It doesn’t communicate anything in itself, nor does it express any aspect 
of us. He calls the face “only opening, only communicability”43. Rather than being what could 
have revealed who we are to our surroundings, our appearance turns into something we cannot 
recognize. It is therefore betraying us, and the idea we have of who we are. “We are all prisoners, 
trapped by our own face.”44 This clashes with our desire to take control over our appearance 
and our “being manifest”45. The diﬀerence between humans and animals is that the latter have 
no interest in this taking of control; they are simply living in their skin without caring about 
it. Hence animals are incapable of acting.46 According to Agamben, this is also the reason why 
animals are not interested in mirrors, or, as he puts it, “the image of an image”47. His thoughts 
on the face seem to touch on what I am interested in doing within my work – not expressing or 
defining a person’s characteristics or ‘soul’ through photography – capturing the contained – but 
rather depicting the meeting – the intersubjective communicability that can happen when two 
creatures stand face to face. This brings to mind Maurice Merleau-Ponty: 
41.  Werckmeister Harmonies directed by Tarr, Bela and Agnes Hranitzky, (Artificial Eye, 2009), DVD.
42.  Giorgio Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics, Translated by Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 90.
43.  Ibid., 92
44.  Ibid.
45.  Ibid.
46.  Ibid., 90.
47.  Ibid., 92.
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Sympathy does not presuppose a genuine distinction between self-consciousness and consciousness of the 
other but rather the absence of a distinction between the self and the other. It is the simple fact that I live 
in the facial expressions of the other, as I feel him living in mine. 48
We, in this sense, embody communication.
 
In conclusion then, ideas of what the face is are contradictory. They range from a conviction 
that that which emanates from the face is a complex combination of truth and falsehood, to 
a belief that our faces are in no way connected with our interiority, our soul, but are simply a 
site of reflection and convention. The skin is variously seen as a site of exposure, or as a screen 
only capable of mirroring. The next section will continue the exploration of faces, but this time 
through the practice. 
2.2 Practice I, Returns
20 Framed C-Type prints, 127 x 101 cm. Installed together at eye height, the life-sized portraits 
recreates the space of the train platforms, and the viewer finds herself in the midst of the crowd. 
Fig II  
Fig II   Installation view from exhibition”Photography Now” Wright State Gallery, Ohio, USA, 2007
48.  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception: An Introduction. 2 edition. (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 146.
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Returns is a photographic series that arises out of the emptiness and solitude of modern urban 
life, a world of accumulated blank hours, institutional anonymity, boredom, and impotence. 
The series are made up of portraits of men waiting for the train to arrive, encountered on the 
platforms of a central commuter station. I created the images in the evening, when the residues 
of the day still linger on the men’s faces. The title of the work, Returns, alludes to the mental and 
spatial state of the subjects, as they inhabit a halfway point between home and work. 
The men are of diﬀerent ages and social classes, but are united by gender and race, and by the 
fact that they all are middle-aged. This demographic group is the most powerful in our society, 
but the men portrayed seem imprisoned in their roles, weighed down by their responsibilities 
and more than a little tired and weary. The work reflects on the position of modern man, trapped 
within the normative conventions of society, at the same time as it expresses the sensation of 
strangeness one can feel before a world that lives up to one’s aspirations less and less. 
Are the men’s faces arranged to fit into the role they ought to play, as Deleuze and Guattari 
suggested in the previous chapter? I don’t think so, and in this work I tried to show that even within 
narrowly defined norms subjectivity can and will escape, precisely through the face. We may slide 
into a character, cut our hair, buy the clothes expected of us. But the face will transplant us away 
from the role and predetermined exchange and become a space where subjectivity will emerge. 
Furthermore, photography, as opposed to the face-to-face meeting, can help us see through 
constructions of power, as it enables us to behold the face of another for an extended period of 
time. The photographs in the Returns series enable us to see beyond the socially allocated roles; 
at the same time, the process of creating the portraits gave the men a stage, as it were, on which 
to express their subjectivity.
All the images in the series were photographed in the evening on the platform of the RER 
commuter trains in Paris Les Halles station, one of the busiest train stations in Europe, and the 
central hub of the Paris transport system. I approached middle-aged men with a camera as they 
stood waiting for their trains on the edge of the platform. The meetings were very quick, often 
lasting only a few minutes. I approached them with a large-format field camera mounted on a 
tripod, and as soon as I had secured their permission I disappeared behind the black cloth, with 
my loupe pressed against the ground glass. I would ask them not to move, then focus entirely 
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on the mechanical operations of the camera, shutting the lens, cocking the shutter, inserting the 
film cassette and finally raising the dark slide and pressing the cable release. In collusion with my 
subjects, I attempted to recreate the moment just before I approached them with my camera. I 
had the idea that I did not want to aﬀect them with my subjectivity, and that not talking would 
help me achieve that. Only when the subjects attempted a smile in front of the camera would 
I engage with them more directly, commanding their face with mine, letting my concentrated 
features be mirrored on their faces. But it is hard to observe one’s own interaction neutrally. This 
was not a lab situation. I am unable to coolly assess my own behaviour whilst at the same time 
producing a photograph in collaboration with someone else. 
I set out the rules for this work, not with the intent to unmask individual characters, nor to 
chase a slippage between intention and eﬀect. All of the sitters are strangers, approached as they 
go about prosaic moments in their day-to-day lives. I tried to give them a chance to choose how 
to represent themselves and their daily experience in a photographic portrait. By placing a large-
format plate camera in front of my sitters, I invited them to make a choice of which pose to 
strike. The reactions of the strangers I accosted were varied; some continued to stare into space 
as if I did not exist. Others turned to face me, resisting the role of the anonymous stranger I cast 
them in, using the situation to create something akin to a classical portrait painting. 
Despite the ambition to give the sitters carte blanche, so to speak, as to which pose to strike in 
front of the camera, one of the things that hits me when I view the resulting photographic prints 
is the similarity in response from the diﬀerent sitters. Where do these facial expressions come 
from? Are they their own, or are they imported from somewhere else? If they are imported from 
somewhere else, might that somewhere else be located in my face? I tell myself that I should be 
observant, to see where else I might find similar expressions. I feel a need to visit portrait galleries 
and read newspapers, and to soak in the faces surrounding my quotidian life in an attempt to 
place my sitters in a wider context, outside the meeting between photographer and subject. My 
own face, however, is maybe the only one that is not so easily observed by myself. I’m not talking 
about the visage that faces me in the mirror, where every feature has been correctly aligned to its 
most flattering position. No, I mean another face, the face I wear after hours of solitary walking, 
up and down a station platform late at night. 
25
Is there something particular in the meeting that makes the men take on these specific faces? Are 
they the same that they wore just before I approached them, the faces that attracted me to those 
particular individuals in the first place? Or does my intervention automatically change what is 
presented to one’s surroundings. To be approached, solicited to appear in a photograph when 
moving around one’s daily life is without doubt an occurrence out of the ordinary. To a certain 
extent, this removes the usual rules governing the gestures of social interaction, leaving a vacuum 
where expressions can be borrowed and personalities reinvented.  Ordinarily, facial expressions are 
taken as the display of interior states and as a means of supplementing the communication that 
occurs through language. But what happens if the facial expression is borrowed from somewhere 
else? To quote James T. Siegel:
To transfer a facial expression implies that one adds something to the repertory available, a little like 
borrowing a word from a foreign language. But it also raises the question of whether, as in the case of 
the word, the expression is given sense. Is it inhabited by its wearer, as it were?49
Siegel goes on to question whether an expression borrowed in this sense does express the feeling 
or interior state that the borrower intended, or even if this kind of expression is at all able to 
express a sentiment. Is it possible for individuals to successfully appropriate expressions, make 
them their own? Starting as infants, we learn our facial expressions through imitation, confirming 
their eﬀectiveness through the responses that they obtain. This sets a pattern that continues 
throughout life, as we all occasionally find ourselves wearing new expressions, picked up from 
a partner, a friend, a teacher or even a mass-media personality. As Georg Simmel notes, it is a 
risky process, as “aesthetically there is no other part of the body whose wholeness can as easily be 
destroyed by the disfigurement of only one of its elements”.50 
Now, looking at the work, I see that my elaborate constructions in order to avoid intersubjectivity 
and mirroring during the photography process miss the point. Constructing the portraiture 
situation like a reversed power relationship (now it was me, not the men, holding the power), 
yet trying to escape the dynamics of that, made me not see what in the end did make the work 
successful – a sense of tender compassion for the individuals behind the attributes, the ghosts in 
the shells, as it were, or those contained within these middle-aged bodies. 
49.  James T Siegel Objects and Objections of Ethnography, (Fordham Univ Press, 2011), 7.
50.  Georg Simmel, Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings ed. David Patrick Frisby and Mike Featherstone. 1 edition, 
(London; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications Ltd, 1998), 276.
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2.3 An Aside – the Necessary Issue of Consent
Writer and curator Helen James stated, during a conference on issues of consent in portrait 
photography, that we look to the photographer to exercise the right kind of power over their 
subjects. What then constitutes this right kind of power? As a photographer working with 
members of the public I need to consider what sort of contribution my work makes. Why do I 
make my images? Can I claim that the way I use my subjects is warranted for the greater good of 
society? Is my contribution unique, and therefore defensible? In what context will they be seen, 
and do I have control over their use? What are they saying? Are the images talking to others or 
themselves? Do the subjects engage with the camera in a way that might indicate consent to the 
photographer? Or do they look like they were bribed, bullied or coerced into taking part in my 
artistic project?51
Producing art through a relationship with another person creates a blurred yet distinctive 
diﬀerence between a piece of work of or with someone. I believe that my work is more a question 
of with, where there is no decisive moment when the camera shutter catches the subject unawares 
but, rather, a decided moment, agreed upon between the sitter and me. A momentary stage 
within the public space has been created, by the setting up of my camera. The protagonists get 
invited to enter this imaginary stage and perform their subjectivity, their identity. 
I approach all my sitters before initiating the process of photographing them, briefly explaining 
my project and its dissemination (i.e. not in newspapers or magazines but, rather, in a gallery 
and/or book context) and asking if they would be willing to participate. So far I have not made 
my sitters sign model release forms as I feel very uncomfortable with a asking them to give up 
their rights in relation to the image. Model release forms connote a commercial context, where 
the image can be used for advertising purposes. I do not want my sitters to worry that their face 
might appear on a billboard advertising a random product in the future. Through my work I 
aim to make visible another’s presence, another’s world, focusing on a demographic group that 
very rarely gets a place on the walls of a gallery or in the pages of a book. It is impossible for me 
to answer the question of how my sitters would feel seeing portraits of themselves in the context 
51.  Helen James, “Issues of Consent in the Photographic Portrait.” (Conference on Photographic Portraiture, 
National Portrait Gallery, 2006)
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of the series displayed on the walls of a gallery. And it demands a certain callousness on the part 
of the photographer, to choose, enlarge and display the defenceless face of another. I often feel 
uncomfortable, worried about showing something people did not want to be shown. Less like 
the hunter chasing that slippage between intention and eﬀect, I attempt to reassure. You exist, 
and I can see you.
2.4 Thinking through Portraiture
Why then do some of these images ‘work’ and some not? What is it that makes the viewer 
connect with certain represented faces and not with others? And how can I possibly draw general 
conclusions from this? Do we all connect to images in the same way? Exhibiting portraits can 
be a disconcerting experience, as the audience reactions range from individuals being moved 
to tears to asking what all the football managers are doing displayed on a wall … so it seems 
clear to me that, just as each of us is more or less interested in the lives of others in real life, so 
there are individual diﬀerences in how we view photographic portraiture, beyond knowledge and 
interpretative abilities. 
I will start by looking at the sitters that have chosen to look away, ignoring the camera and me 
in an apparent attempt to re-form the solitary moment that just got interrupted. Michael Fried 
writes about the French 18th-century critic Denis Diderot's view on genre paintings, “simply 
disregarding the beholder was not enough. It was necessary to obliviate him, to deny his presence, 
to establish positively insofar as that could be done that he had not been taken into account.”52 
The more absorbed in concentration the character in the painting appears, the more convinced 
we are that he is not aware of being beheld. And if he is not aware of being beheld, surely then 
the expression that we see on his face must be his own. Unchanged by the presence of an artist 
with a camera or paintbrush. 
52.  Michael Fried, Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot. New edition edition. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 103.
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The more my subjects seem absorbed into some inner, private, thoughts, in a moment of longer 
duration than the fraction of a section it takes for the shutter to open and to close again, the 
more engrossing the resulting image. But can this go too far? Doesn’t a succession of images of 
men staring into the middle distance risk appearing overly theatrical? After all, we all know that 
both the camera and I were present, a mere footstep away. Are we not simply witnessing my 
sitter’s skill in acting, or mine at directing? Trying to pinpoint which images work and which 
do not confuses me; my vocabulary does not seem precise enough to specify the feeling that is 
conveyed in what I consider to be the stronger pieces. 
So how about the men that chose to face the camera – or myself, hovering just above it? To 
borrow Fried’s words again: “the portrait calls for exhibiting a subject, the sitter, to the public 
gaze: put another way, the basic action depicted in a portrait is the sitter’s presentation of himself 
or herself to be beheld.”53 Of course, this action is present in both the cases where the sitter chose 
to acknowledge the camera or myself, and those where he did not. But in the instances when 
my sitters engage directly with the camera, sometimes staring it down with a put-upon strength, 
even arrogance, and at other times making their solitude and vulnerability manifest, we are 
under the impression that the sitters are communicating directly with us, and that through their 
gaze we can gain access to their interiority. When my work is at its most successful, Levinas’s 
theories seem to come into play, of the face as a redemptive surface, something that enables us 
to see beyond conventions54. We approach the illusion that we know the sitters, as we mentally 
invent a life and character for them. Is it possible that the gap I am looking for when creating my 
images, in psychological as well as sociogeographical terms,55 has the added eﬀect on my sitters of 
making them lose their conception of themselves as of a certain kind? There is a defamiliarization 
taking place, and with that defamiliarization the knowledge of how to act in a certain given 
situation disappears. 
53.  Ibid., 109
54.   See page 19 for a discussion, and Levinas, 133  
55.  By sociogeographical gap, I refer to choosing to set up my camera in transitional places such as train stations, 
hospital lobbies and public walkways.
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What does the lack of smiles in my work mean? One way of thinking about smiling is as evidence 
of masking.56 By not allowing the men to smile, meeting every attempt in that direction with a 
neutral, serious expression, I am denying them the opportunity to hide. 
The smile is an almost automatic response to the camera being pointed at one’s person, and 
from infancy we are trained to smile for our parents’ camera, for the school photograph, for the 
holiday snaps with friends and lovers. This smiling face is not connected to reality; it is a photo-
face. I am interested in capturing another, more private expression. 
Like a Baudelairian flâneur, I am attracted to small moments of everyday experience that make 
me feel, make me share the humanity of the other. Small moments that emerge from the weave 
of our everyday existence and reach directly into my body, like a miniscule dagger poking my 
insides. Reminding me that I am not alone. Teasing me out of my shell, connecting me to my 
surroundings. Psychoanalyst Darian Leader suggests the role of art in society is to provide a 
set of tools to help us mourn, and that art can lead the way in helping people understand that 
we all need to find individual ways of expressing our emotions.57 I would like to extend the 
concept to not only include mourning but also a sense of disconnection – not one brought on by 
mourning or loss, but an ever-present feeling of alienation created by the limits of one’s capacity 
for human interaction. Leader goes on to quote psychoanalyst Ginette Raimbault: “What no one 
can understand about my pain, someone can express in such a way that I can recognize myself in 
what I cannot share.”58 It is here the roots of my practice can be found, the drive that makes me 
go out again and again with my camera, in search of a subject in possession of a face that can help 
me articulate, through a photographic portrait, that unspeakable connectedness with others.
Today I went in search of an elusive subject again. I saw him first two years ago, wearing 
blue, washed-out tights, doing lap after lap on the large speed-skating oval on the outskirts 
of town. A very old body with incredibly long limbs. He hunches over on his speed-skates, 
slowly swinging his long arms from side to side, looking stiﬀ, fragile and vulnerable as he 
moves forward at a pace that, although it is considerably faster than mine, 
56.  Paul Ekman and Wallace V Friesen, Unmasking the Face: A Guide to Recognizing Emotions from Facial Clues. 
(Gift Edition edition. Prentice-Hall, 1975), 81.
57.  Darian Leader, The New Black: Mourning, Melancholia and Depression, (London: Penguin, 2009), 87-88.
58.  Ginette Raimbault quoted in Ibid., 88.
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looks like slow motion. I have wanted to film him since I first saw him. At night in the 
dark, with the only light coming from a tracking camera running alongside him at a fixed 
distance. His body’s slow laborious movements will fill the frame in a continuous flow. It 
resonates with my body, in pain and eﬀort. I see him having to bow to old age, to slow 
down stiﬀ muscles. I am fascinated by those movements where one can discern a whole life. 
Like watching the old man I met in Norway this summer. His body knew exactly what 
it needed to do. I wish now that I had filmed him cutting the grass with his old wooden 
reaper rather than photographing him in the studio. He, too, was over 80 and very tall. 
So I have a type, it seems.
I did not find the man at the ice rink, but another old skater, a former world champion, 
told me the man's name. E. He doesn’t skate well, the champion skater said, he doesn’t do 
oversteps. I had to explain that I was interested in the eﬀort rather than the result. He told 
me the old man walks across town every day to the skating rink. E is a loner, he said, a 
strange character. He is a millionaire, yet he finds food in skips. He doesn’t use buses. He 
used to travel abroad without bringing any money, that sort of thing. 
When I got home, I googled E. I found out he was a writer. In the ’70s and ’80s he 
published poetry and diarist travel books from far-flung places. The ghost of Vivian Maier 
reappears – an ageing dumpster diver, of sensitive and artistic inclination. A loner in 
old age. Yet to me he signalled beauty and grace, some of that deep humanity of the old 
man in Werckmeister Harmonies, before whose presence we need to put everything but 
compassion and empathy aside. 
So, thinking through making has led me towards the importance of the exchange between 
faces and subjectivities. If the face takes a more privileged position over other body parts for its 
(possibly) superior abilities in communication, then in the same way the eyes must be predicated 
over the rest of the face. The following section discusses the importance of the gaze in establishing 
a basis for communication.
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2.5 On Looking
The importance of the mutual look cannot be underestimated. The interchange of looks is 
something that is with us from birth, as the primary means of communication between mother 
and baby. We know that the earliest brain developments in human infants are fuelled by mother 
and child looking at each other’s eyes and faces. Leading neuropsychoanalyst Allan Schore calls 
this process ´psychobiological attunement´ and goes on to state that “The mother’s emotionally 
expressive face is the most potent source of visuoaﬀective information and in face-to-face 
interactions it serves as a visual imprinting system for the infant’s developing nervous system.”59 
Preverbal interaction is thus entirely central to our early lives, and without it we would not 
be able to grow and develop. It is no wonder that the human face in the form of portraits is 
commonly used as a means of communication. Yet there must be a diﬀerence between how we 
look at the actual face of another, and how we view a photographically reproduced face.60 
In contemporary Western society there are set rules in place regarding both how to look at others, 
and how to avoid it. Maintaining the social equilibrium of pretending to ignore others reinforces 
our sense of security when in public. This is made manifest by the ritual avoidance of eye contact, 
where only small children are exempt from the rule by being too young to have learnt it. To look 
at someone is perceived as an act of aggression. Witness Robert de Niro in Taxi Driver pulling 
his guns out in front of the mirror: “Are you looking at me? I don’t see anybody else here so you 
must be looking at me.”61 This can be contrasted with the photograph, an artefact that allows us 
to look at others for an extended period of time.
59.  Allan N Schore, Aﬀect Regulation and the Origin of the Self: The Neurobiology of Emotional Development. 1 
edition, (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1999) 91.
60.  My son O was born in the middle of this PhD. It constituted a pivotal moment, when I left ideas of the 
fragmented self behind: thoughts that the only thing you can photograph are reflections of your own face. In 
contrast, I was struck by how much of him was already present to me, from the very first moment we set eyes on one 
another. Existing in an intense non-verbal interaction, looking at O’s face and thinking of how it interacted with 
mine, this dance of mirroring made me consider how language can get in the way of meeting the other. Perhaps it 
is precisely this lack of verbal interaction that draws me towards strangers, especially in other countries. When we 
cannot access a shared language, all we have left is looking. Is this the key to why so many of the anthropological 
photographs have a hold of me? Or the images from Tuol Sleng? Situations where there would have been no, or 
barely any, verbal interaction between subject and photographer? 
61.  Taxi Driver directed by Martin Scorsese, 1976, (Sony Pictures Home Entertainment, 2007), DVD. 
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Eyes have existed for some 400 million years and as soon as eyes started being used by predators 
when stalking their prey it would have been advantageous for the prey to be able to sense when 
they were being looked at. Many animals react by escaping when they are in the proximity of 
something resembling an eye. Butterflies, peacocks and some types of tropical fish all have eyelike 
markings, usually a spot of colour inside a ring of another colour, a so-called ocellus, that are 
used for defensive purposes. Perhaps it is not so strange that the act of being observed carries 
connotations of danger and aggression. Robert Sheldrake has interviewed security personnel 
working with CCTV, many of whom insisted that people know instinctively when they are 
being looked at through the security camera.62 Leader, moreover, makes a connection between 
the ocellus and the camera lens. They can both be defined as eyes that cannot see, like the eyes of 
the blind, and as such inherently more unnerving than ordinary eyes.63 
The gaze contains an immanent power relationship and this is further increased when the gazed 
upon is denied the possibility of reciprocity. Both dark sunglasses and one-way mirrors in police 
interview rooms work as implements of intimidation. The gazed upon is put into position as 
inert and defenceless by their inability to return the gaze directed upon them. What was a 
horizontal, interactive, democratic act of communication is transformed into a unidirectional, 
vertical demonstration of power that enforces subjectivity, passivity. Interestingly, it matters less 
if the gazed upon is really observed or not; the insecurity of not knowing suﬃces. With this 
uncertainty comes an increased lack of control over the image one projects. Part of what can 
make blind people disconcerting may be that we cannot verify if they truly are blind. How do 
they perceive us? We feel an anxiety adjoined to the lack of control over how they read us. Thus 
the ‘gaze’ of the camera lens can be seen to amplify the discomfort we feel when being looked at 
by ordinary eyes, as a result of both our inability to return the gaze, and the absence of influence 
over how we are being seen. 
Leader declares that most humans find it so unbearable to be stared at that they feel compelled to 
assume a mask in order to cope with the gaze. Generally we have all experienced feeling 
anxiety or a sense of shame when we realize that we are being observed in a private situation, 
62.  David Brittain, ‘Eye Contact: Interview with Rupert Sheldrake’ in Creative Camera no. 341 (1996), 18.
63.  Darian Leader, Stealing the Mona Lisa: What Art Stops Us from Seeing (London: Faber & Faber, 2002), 35.
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regardless of whether we are doing anything illicit or not. We swiftly rearrange our facial features 
to correspond to our public persona.64 According to Leader, Lacan emphasizes the fact that we 
are being looked at before we ever look, and so the gaze becomes caught up in this interchange. 
Leader goes as far as to argue, “we see each other, or strive to be seen, as we imagine others look 
at us”.65 So it follows that what one sees with one’s own eyes is mixed up with the question of 
what someone else sees. 
It is interesting to consider that, when sculptures or other artworks containing a face are 
destroyed, the eyes are often defaced first, as if it makes the process of destruction easier when 
the work cannot look back.66 This can be seen as a manifestation of sorts of the deeply held 
human belief in the inherent, malignant force that resides in the gaze. In most cultures in the 
world the concept of the evil eye exists in one form or another.67 It is usually associated with a 
belief in the destructive power of the look, projected either from a man, object or animal as an 
expression of envy, greed or aggression. This gaze can be debilitating, and cause bad luck, illness 
or even death.68 
Craig Owens poses the question of whether the camera is “simply a device engineered to 
reproduce the eﬀects of the evil eye”.69 Just like the evil eye is thought to have the power to 
kill, so the camera can arrest movement and hence freeze life. Through his reading of Lacan, 
Owens proposes that the freezing into a pose that often occurs, completely unnecessarily from 
a technical viewpoint, when someone is about to be photographed, is in fact a resistance on the 
part of the subject. Rather than freezing in order to aid the photographer, the subject stays still as 
a way to protect himself from the malevolent gaze.70 Hence a mimicking of the reaction of many 
animals when perceiving a threat, perhaps through the eyes of the predator, occurs. The evil eye 
could also be considered another potential explanation for the necessity of wearing masks. 
64.  Ibid., 19
65.  Ibid., 16.
66.  Ibid., 18.
67.  Rupert Sheldrake, Seven Experiments That Could Change the World: A Do-It-Yourself Guide to Revolutionary 
Science. New edition edition. (Rochester, Vt: Inner Traditions Bear and Company, 2002), 89.
68.  Edward S and Virginia Mason Giﬀord, The Evil Eye; Studies in the Folklore of Vision. Drawings by Virginia Mason 
Giﬀord. 1st Edition edition. (New York MacMillan, 1958), 4.
69.  Craig Owens, Beyond Recognition: Representation, Power and Culture. New Ed edition. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994), 210.
70.  Ibid., 211.
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Just as the origin of the tradition for brides to wear veils at their weddings is probably to protect 
them from the evil eye,71 so the mask can be thought to be there “not to express anything, but 
to ward oﬀ an evil force.”72 In the following chapter I will describe some moments I felt unable 
to photograph – where it would not have been appropriate to include my camera – or even, 
perhaps, for me to let my eyes linger in the first place.
2.5.1 Writing some moments I could not capture photographically, I
The evenings I spent in the station were full of meetings.73 The homeless young man, so eager to 
show that he was out of the gutter, now trying to rebuild his life, with diﬃculty but determination. 
Telling me his story, not really in search of compassion so much as having a strong desire to simply 
share, with someone, anyone. “The stranger …. often receives the most surprising revelations 
and confidences, at times reminiscent of a confessional, about matters which are kept carefully 
hidden from everybody with whom one is close.” 74 When I enter a particular location to work, 
whether it is for a duration of hours or days, I am very much a stranger on these terms. The 
camera invites confidences because it makes me conspicuous, placing me outside of the day-to-
day life. 
And all the others, the others, in this never-ending theatre of human emotion. The happy 
families, with everyone hugging, the lost father with the three surly but incredibly 
attractive teenage daughters, the mismatched couples, the too-well-matched couples. The 
little boy with the crazy mum. The old man who appeared to be made out of paper, so 
fragile that if you touched him he might crumble. At ten in the evening, platform B, every 
evening, summer and winter, I saw him wait for his train. What was a man like him 
71.  Giﬀord, 33.
72.  Leader, Stealing.., 43.
73.  In the words of Ronald Barthes, the station is “a vast organism which houses the big trains, the urban trains, 
the subway, a department store, and a whole underground commerce – the station gives the district this landmark 
which, according to certain urbanists, permits the city to signify, to be read”. Human drama, tragedy, happiness, it’s 
all to be found there. Roland Barthes, Empire of Signs (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), 56.
74.  Simmel, 145.
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doing traversing the big city late at night? I photographed him once. But the resulting 
image turned him into an ordinary old man; the white skin no longer translucent like 
rice paper. Another evening, standing around, waiting, at the far end of a platform. A 
young man was leaning up against the wall, wearing the latest in the American-style 
hip-hop look so popular in the suburbs. I couldn’t help sneaking looks at his posturing 
appearance, his macho swagger, whereupon I saw a lonely tear make its way down his 
cheek. I looked away, thinking that what I had seen was nothing more than a slightly 
irritated eye; but there it was, he was crying, trying to conceal the tears as best he could, 
wiping them away in-between the hard-boy poses. Suddenly the presence of my camera felt 
wholly inappropriate. Suppressing my desire to approach the young man I walked away, 
adhering to the rules of privacy of the big city.
2.6 On Writing
To write about experiences, or to render them photographically? The photographic process is 
complicated. It involves asking for, and being granted, permission. It involves collaboration. 
Photography is something which “reaches into the world as an intruder and therefore creates 
a disturbance”.75 An awareness of the upheaval creates a weight, and is something one has to 
navigate as a practitioner. A developed sense of empathy can, from this perspective, work as a 
hindrance rather than the aid, or even prerequisite, it normally is when connecting with others. 
Writing, on the other hand, is self-suﬃcient. Ethical issues are still present if the task is to create 
a written representation of another, but the act itself is discreet and can be done hidden away. 
Photography, however, is, at least in my own practice, necessarily co-located and embodied. I 
must interact to create, form a relationship, however temporary, with my subject. Rather than 
simply observe from a distance. 
Walter Benjamin claims that “something that seemed inalienable to us, the securest among 
our possessions were taken from us: the ability to exchange experiences”.76 The reason for this, 
75.  Rudolf Arnheim, New Essays on the Psychology of Art, (University of California Press, 1986), 105.
76.  Walter Benjamin, Illuminations New Ed edition, (London: Pimlico, 1999), 83.
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in Benjamin’s view, is that everything is already too explained, the stories too infused with 
elucidations. He goes on to state that this, in fact, constitutes half the art of storytelling, “to keep 
a story free from explanation as one reproduces it.”77 Let the reader interpret in a way that makes 
sense to him/her, and the story will achieve dimensions that information lacks. This can stand as 
a parameter of what I set out to achieve, both in my visual works and my writing. 
Baudelaire’s cycle of prose poems is a good example of the kind of writing I am interested in. 
The prose poems contained in the collection Spleen are an engaging attempt to use poetic will to 
transform the ugly and the everyday. They are an eﬀort to understand the urban experience, and 
can be seen as a literary replication of the erratic wanderings of a stroller, a flâneur, through the 
streets of Paris. Baudelaire describes the city of his experience as both beautiful and squalid, and 
the magic of the anonymous chance encounters that typify urban life. He uses fragmentation, 
disruption and dislocation and surprising juxtapositions to conjure the experience of an unstable 
and menacing city. Some passages have an almost uncanny eﬀect on me, as they so echo the 
feelings I had when making certain images, mostly on the streets of Paris. Here is Baudelaire’s 
description of an encounter in ‘The Widows’: “which is the sadder widow, which inspires more 
melancholy, she who holds by the hand an urchin who cannot share her thoughts, or she who 
walks quite alone? I cannot decide….”78 .
The poem brings to mind a portrait of a mother and son I found on the platform of an RER 
station on the outskirts of Paris. The childish colours of the architecture set up a jarred note with 
the inhabitants of the space. There is a certain sense of weight, a sadness, perhaps, in the woman’s 
appearance, a feeling that she seems unable to share with her child. They are mutually avoiding 
both looking at each other and making bodily contact. Both look utterly alone, together. You 
may ask, upon reading this, as did Baudelaire’s imaginary companion, “Are you sure this legend 
is the true one?” And I will answer with his words: “But what do I care for the facts, if this reality 
which is outside me has helped me live, to know I exist, to understand the kind of man I am?”79 
And join the long line of artists, who, in the years that have passed since Baudelaire walked the 
streets of Paris, have aspired to become the new Painters of Modern Life. 
77.  Benjamin, 87.
78.  Charles Baudelaire and ed. Louise Varèse, Paris Spleen, (New York: New Directions, 1970), 21.
79.  Ibid., 12.
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So it follows that using writing as a tool helped me identify exactly what I am in search of when I 
photograph – those moments when I feel the boundaries between self and other dissolve. In the 
following section I will describe the next practice project, where I put photography to one side 
and relied on writing my experiences: the intersubjective encounters with others. 
2.6.1 Practice II, A Place To Call Home 
DV, 11 minutes. Shown as a large video projection with sounds on speakers in a darkened space, exact 
size depending on the screening space. 
A three-month residency in the Israeli Negev Desert.80 I was invited to create portraits of 
inhabitants of development towns81 in the Negev for an exhibition in Jerusalem. A week after 
my arrival, war between Israel and Lebanon broke out.82 Watching planes and helicopters loaded 
with bombs fly overhead, only to return bare, their deadly cargo unloaded over the inhabitants of 
Lebanon, made the thought of creating artworks diﬃcult. I felt a need to understand the country 
that hosted me, this place of immense history, conflict and contradiction, so I travelled around in 
the company of the curator, planning to make portraits of people I encountered along the way, 
much in the same way that I created Returns. 
The first part of the journey. Getting on the bus in Tel Aviv and asking for a ticket to 
Umm al-Fahm, it became immediately apparent that something was out of the ordinary. 
Umm al-Fahm, the driver said, raising his eyebrows, what on earth are you going there 
for? It is an Arabic city. Half an hour later, getting oﬀ the bus at a stop along the main 
motorway, something was diﬀerent. The air, the smells and the landscape had remained 
the same, but the demographics had shifted. Here we were looked at, observed, mostly with 
80. Midbar/Unidee, a residency directed by Rafram Chaddad, Mitzpe Ramon, Israel. 5th of July - 30th of Septem-
ber 2006.
81.  Constructed from the 1950s onwards as part of a population decentralization plan with the goal of conquering 
the frontiers of the territory. 
82. The Second Lebanon War 2006, 12th of July - 14th of August 2006
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curiosity or desire, but also, it has to be admitted, with hostility. Should I have worn my 
full-length skirt I asked myself, would that have been more respectful? Beautiful proud 
men, looking, staring, with a mixture of desire and hostility. 
We were picked up by a young man, who took us to the computer shop where he worked. I 
began taking photographs. It was hard. How do I look at an Arabic man, me, who claims 
to be completely unprejudiced? The man, too, felt shy, unsure of how to meet me. It was as 
if I were unable to command the situation, create enough intimacy to really communicate 
with him. It was too fast, too soon. Neither of us was ready for the intensity of the face-to-
face meeting. His status as a victim confused me. How can I relate to Palestinians whilst 
enjoying the hospitality of Israel? I wanted to say, to imply, hey, I’m one of the good guys. 
I am on your side. I came to meet you. But nonetheless I reside on the other side of the 
fence, sleeping in beautiful desert farms, eating gourmet meals, and drinking wine from 
vineyards created on the land of his banished people. How, then, can I possibly be one of 
the good guys? One hour in an Arabic city will not redeem that. Maybe the reason all of 
us on the residency feel compelled to make ‘political’ art, regardless of where our ‘normal’ 
practice is situated, is that we feel guilty. Guilty for enjoying our stay in the comfortable 
bubble, whilst hearing artillery fire shelling Gaza in the background. 
An hour later the visit on the other side was over and we were back at the bus stop. The 
bus arrived, driven by an Israeli macho man with a shaved head and strong shoulders. 
Despite his appearance he was visibly nervous having to stop his bus outside this, the 
biggest Arabic city on Israeli territory. “Hurry, hurry,” he said, “just get on”, when I 
started searching my purse for the correct change. The bus, filled with soldiers, was quickly 
set in motion, driving onwards to safer territory. 
Another change of buses. A small station, almost devoid of people, except soldiers. We are 
continuing north. After an hour or so night comes, and with it darkness. This darkness 
makes our entry into the war zone all the more spectacular. A fire on our right-hand 
side, a fire more beautiful than any I have ever seen in my life. And then a second fire on 
the left-hand side, a third, a fourth. My naïve surprise: is this what war looks like? Are 
the rockets really falling here, now? We get oﬀ the bus at the last stop, and continue by 
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hitchhiking towards our final destination, loud sounds breaking the calmness of the night. 
This is real. This is scary. Rockets are falling here, around us. Is this an air alarm? Is it 
this side hitting the other, or them hitting us? I am angry, angry with myself for being so 
ill-informed, and angry with R for not finding out that bombs were falling here before 
we set oﬀ on our crazy mission. I who, when I saw the frightening scene of the Israeli air 
force practising carpet-bombing in the desert whilst I was on a hike the day before the war 
started, swore to myself that I would not go near any war zone. 
Arriving at our destination I feel ashamed. How could we be so stupid? Bumbling ill-
informed artists, tourists into other people’s misery. Whoops, is there a war going on? 
Really? Here? No, we just came for the barbeque. Foreign war correspondents in flak 
jackets stare at us, their brows furrowed. Weeks of hard work can be read on their faces, 
months of witnessing the unspeakable. 
Going to sleep later that night in the village bomb shelter; all the suites of the small hotel 
our host runs are booked out by foreign media. I have a vision of a rocket landing on the 
party we just left, of us getting up in the morning and finding a fire in place of the hotel. 
The noise of gunfire can be heard throughout the night. Are people getting killed by these 
guns? Now? What is the reality like on the other side of the border? After breakfast an air 
alarm, and directly afterwards a loud boom. A rocket has landed just beyond the row of 
houses we are in. We run back into the shelter with some of the foreign journalists, but 
somehow it is hard to take it seriously. I don’t feel afraid anymore. The war bug has bitten 
me, the excitement, the bonding. The siege mentality. When we get back to the nearest 
village, Kiryat Shmona, it is me, not R., who wants to linger in the deserted town, a 
village in which the ground is scorched by fires and whose surrounding hills are hidden 
by smoke.83
83. This journey was referenced in Benny Ziffer's article in Haaretz newspaper on the occasion of R's incar-
ceration and eventual release from Libyan prison in 2010: " The last time we met was in the middle of the night, 
in the north, during the Second Lebanon War. Katyushas were flying and the forest between Kiryat Shmona and 
Metula was burning. And I was heading in my old Ford Fiesta toward a kibbutz in the Galilee panhandle where a 
diaper factory was being bombed. And who was standing by the side of the road and looking for a ride? Rafram, 
with a Swedish photographer, off to do a project which they explained as we drove."
“Artist in a Cage - Haaretz Daily Newspaper Israel News.” http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/artist-
in-a-cage-1.307848.
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As a newcomer, a guest in Israeli society, I am constantly being presented with politicized 
narratives. Casual encounters turn into meetings between informer and informed. How to 
defend oneself from all these ready-made perspectives and subjective histories? You are either 
with us or against us, friend or enemy. An attack on us, in this vulnerable position we are in, 
could destroy us. Who are you, a fascist? 
I felt a need to make some of these narratives explicit. The stories were too important to discard, 
to remain as anecdotes for myself only. Perhaps the urge to use text was an attempt too at 
making my own position more clear, to communicate what I had learnt of Israels history and 
the condition of life for its inhabitants. I experimented combining my portraits with short text, 
stories I had been told during the meetings in conjunction with the images. But these attempts 
ended up as an unequal marriage. The text renders the images superfluous, as it allows us to 
focus our search for meaning in the text rather than in the representation of the face of the other. 
Thinking of how else include narrative text gave me the idea of borrowing a video camera, creating 
filmed interviews of some of the people I had previously photographed. But I found the faces 
distracting, they and their immediate surroundings proclaiming too much. In a photographic 
portrait, the voice of the person is suppressed. Once I combined both voice and face, something 
was lost. Our imagination is not asked to fill in any gaps; the talking heads constitute a format 
we are familiar with from cheap televised documentaries. 
I re-thought what to do once more and reconstructed, through writing, an imaginary walk 
through an anonymous development town in the Israeli Negev desert, and used fragments from 
my encounters with the inhabitants as a narrative. This allowed me to make explicit that the 
narrative is mediated through me, subjective and by no means complete, nor setting out an 
undisputable truth, in a way I was unable to do when connecting people's narrative's to their 
portraits. The title of the project is borrowed from a prospectus encouraging the Jewish diaspora 
to immigrate to Israel, proclaiming the merits of life in the Holy Land. Combining empty 
views of the built environment with fragmented testimonies, the film show a very diﬀerent 
reality: certain waves of immigrants haven’t known anything but peripheral zones of habitation, 
becoming only a demographic number to be counted in a society under threat. The quiet film 
resulting from the meetings with the inhabitants of the desert poses the question of what their 
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role is: that of hero, victims or perpetrators.
When using moving images the power relationship is other – here, the image is usually dominant, 
driving the narrative forward. A recorded woman’s voice – not mine – retells the story whilst 
slow, unbearably long clips of cityscapes from development towns in the Negev can be seen. The 
lack of occurrences, of narrative or drama in the clips echo the sense of emptiness the narrative 
expresses. Using video rather than still photography for the first time was primarily a means of 
letting the narrative unfold over time, but it also becomes a means of forcing the viewer to hold 
the image for an extended duration, mirroring the boredom and emptiness that characterizes the 
locations.
Script: 
I was trying to understand.
So when I saw Aziza standing in the doorway of her house, something in her eyes made me approach her.  After 
we arrived into Israel they brought us here, she said. There was only sand. No water, nothing.  We had to pay 
a lot of money to get a place on the boat. The man that registered us said that there are lots of fruits in Israel, 
fruits and white pigeons. We used to buy pigeons for a lot of money there, so we felt excited. But when we came 
here there was not even bread.
They brought us here on trucks. When we arrived nobody wanted to get oﬀ. The driver started the truck again, 
and drove us around in a circle in the sand. Then he took us back to the same spot. He told us that it was a 
diﬀerent place. When we still didn’t get down he got out and left the truck. So when night fell we had no choice 
but to get oﬀ and enter the houses.
My husband got a job plastering houses. So many houses had to be built, for the people that kept arriving. In 
that time there was no hand cream, so he had to use margarine. Over there he used to run his own business. 
After a while he sent a letter to his sister asking her to find a house again, in Morocco. He wanted to go back. 
But I didn’t want to go back. I would have felt ashamed in front of my family and friends.
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I left Aziza standing in the doorway and kept walking.
I called a friend who used to live here. I don’t want to talk about it, he said. I don’t
remember anything from that place. It has nothing to do with me. I never had any connection with it. He 
quickly said goodbye and put the phone down.
•
A while later a young man approached me. He started talking. The first thing that struck me when I got oﬀ the 
plane is how small everything is, he said, small and faded by the sun. We felt like strangers here. It was hard 
to be accepted. We didn’t understand the locals, a diﬀerent mentality. We stuck together with our own people. 
I was very proud to serve in the army. I was maybe over-motivated. When you are over-motivated there are a 
lot of things that are disappointing. But I gave my part to this country, to the survival, and now I feel like I 
have earned the right to live here.
People here say that we are Russian. There, they said that we were Jewish. But look, I’m not angry about that 
anymore.
He shook my hand and said goodbye.
•
I sat down in a cafe to have lunch. The owner joined me. My parents came here from Baghdad in 1951. Look, I 
have their passport here and it is written: exit only, to go but not return. My parents, in this way, they finished 
the Diaspora of maybe 2000 years. My mother used to be called Samira. When she came she had to change it. 
A Jewish woman can’t be called Samira here. 
I was born here and my father was very ecstatic: you will never know what is the ghetto; you will never know 
what is the meaning of ghetto. The first generation thought that their children would be completely clean from 
fears, and that they would be healthy, happy and secure. And now we are in the same situation again.
I finished my lunch and walked back into the sunshine.
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•
Two girls were sitting in the shade of some pine trees. They looked like sisters. One of them oﬀered me a glass 
of water. Our parents came when they were 18, directly here, they told me. Nobody gave them an option to 
choose. The government sent them where they thought it would be good for the country. They set my parents’ 
future and their present at the same time. Only educated people knew that the centre would be better. But 
the government wanted to develop the desert. The people here never had the same chance. They were brought 
into these places. There is no work here. There is nothing. Half the people here are Russian, the others from 
Morocco. The government didn’t think at all. They paid the city halls to receive people. Like cattle. There was 
a price on every person’s head. But we want to stay here. We believe this town has a future. We just hope that 
it comes soon.
I thanked them for the water and left.
•
I saw a man waiting for the next bus to Be’er Sheva, a small bag by his feet. He told me he had been visiting 
his mother. I asked him what it felt like, growing up here. My experience was that I was alone, he said. I felt 
very alone. I felt diﬀerent from everyone else. On the outside I might have seemed like I had many friends. But 
that was only on the outside. In my home I felt alone too. My father hit me. In those years it was part of the 
education. It was common. I had a lot of arguments and fights with my sisters, because it was a small flat and 
we shared a room. My father solved these problems by hitting us. 
What I remember most when I got older was that there was nothing to do. I spent most of my time with a 
group of friends, and our mission was to protect ourselves from reality. We felt locked into this small town, 
wanting to fly but there were no opportunities. It felt like a prison. There was nowhere to go. But I knew all the 
time that there was something else, somewhere else, I just didn’t know what it was, or what I was looking for. 
I only knew that I wanted to be there. 
The bus arrived and the man boarded it.
•
60
I followed Yusef to his balcony. The sun was going down. He had a view over the whole town. 
This is Israel, he said. The closest place to God. Centre of the universe. Everyone thinks that the world is 
running around, but it is the universe running around the centre here. This is my home. This is your home. 
This is where we belong.
In conclusion, A Place to Call Home exist in various incarnations depending on the context. The 
moving image part has been shown in exhibition spaces and as part of various film festivals, 
and the portraits, unframed and printed in various formats have  been exhibited and published. 
I prefer showing the moving image part however, as the work marked a shift away from the 
traditional photographic portrait, and opened up my practice towards other ways of creating an 
art work out of my empathic meetings with other subjectivities. In terms of how the audience is 
positioned in relation to the work, I also find the moving image part more succesful. Here the 
audience is taken in hand, directed to look and to listen for a predetermined amount of time. 
The portraits are both harder to place and easier to dismiss. Perhaps because the framework for 
them was too open - unlike Returns, where I chose one space and one demographic group; the 
inhabitants were too diverse to be distilled into a relatively small selection of potraits. 
2.6.2 Writing some moments I could not capture photographically, II
Upon my return to London I kept writing down those moments of daily life that touched me. I 
am beginning to see, through the writing, how empathy and our connections with others form 
the central point that all my work revolves around. Furthermore, this seeing through writing rather 
than seeing through the camera liberates my practice from the strict confines of photographic 
portraiture. I investigate my own drive to take photographs, rather than the photographs 
themselves. 
61
I have heard so many conversations of heartbreak recently. First there was the girl, speaking 
on her mobile phone in Swedish, on the number 49 bus in Chelsea. She kept pleading 
with her lover to realize how much he loved her, to change his mind. Or to make his mind 
up. She was hurt, upset, and unable to terminate the conversation. Why? Why? Why don’t 
you want to be with me? 
The second conversation took place nearby, on a bus ride from Sloane Square across 
Battersea Bridge. It was already underway when I approached the front seats of a 
double-decker bus. I caught the man, or boy, looking at me with something approaching 
annoyance when I sat down, across the aisle on an otherwise empty deck. I didn’t realize 
why at first. It was only when I kept hearing the words “I have to see you”, in heavily 
Swedish-accented English, that I understood. But then it was too late to move. “I have to 
see you. Now. Only for five minutes. But I have to see you. It doesn’t matter why. I just 
have to see you. I have to know that you will do this for me. That you will see me when I 
need to see you. Now. Only for five minutes”. The boyman, manboy, wore a bright green 
shirt. I wondered about the person at the other end of the phone. His lover. Was it a man 
or a woman? Had they been lovers for some time? He left the bus, still on the phone, and 
my eyes followed his green figure moving down the street until I couldn’t see him anymore. 
Another day, this time in the library. A beautiful Dane, on the phone to a long-lost friend 
in Melbourne, speaking of her lover leaving her some months ago. Life has been chaotic, 
she said. I haven’t had much life lately. I haven’t been in touch with anyone. I started 
counselling. It became very chaotic. Very destructive. I would love to see you. I would love 
to visit. I love you so much. She hung up and went back to her reading. I felt strange, 
sitting so close to her, side by side. Knowing all this about her. What had he been like, the 
man that left her?
I went upstairs. Two young men were already sitting at the long table, facing each other. I 
sat down next to them; they were of that indefinable type. The type that looks like someone 
young, that looks like someone old. It has something to do with the clothes, maybe, or with 
the posture. With how they comb their hair. There is a sense of not quite inhabiting a 
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body as much as inhabiting a brain. Or is the plastic that they are made of somehow less 
malleable, or shaped by other forces than their contemporaries are, to paraphrase Kenneth 
Gergen?
One of the men was talking. He talked of walking. He talked of being a fast walker. 
He talked of always having a goal when walking. If there wasn’t a pre-existing one, he 
would invent one. He talked of walking next to his mother. The man opposite was quiet. 
He nodded and made small sounds of reassurance. He did not ask any questions, nor did 
he talk of how he walked. Somehow the topic shifted to Caviar. The talking man talked 
of Caviar. He talked about not liking it. He talked of not remembering what fish black 
caviar originates from. He talked about it, he talked around it, but never did he ask the 
question. A gap in the monologue appeared. And then, timid, quiet, I heard the voice of 
the other man for the first time. Sturgeon, he said. Sturgeon from the Black Sea. 
The men were both eating. The talker had an old-fashion red food Thermos in front 
of him, filled with some indefinable food. The quiet man ate something from a plastic 
container. The talker bent down towards the floor, and unpacked a plastic water bottle 
from his backpack. The bottle was filled with a dark, almost black substance. As he turned 
the plastic bottle top, the sound of carbonated gas escaping could be heard. My mother 
packed Coke, he said, surprised. Normally she doesn’t like me eating too much sugar. 
The significance of the above moments is that they touched that nerve, the urge to create a 
rendition of my heart being touched. The moments when I, to return once again to Baudelaire, 
have had “my part in every joy and every sorrow that circumstance reveals to me.”84 There is a 
sense of connectedness, or sometimes precisely a failed connectedness, prevalent in most of the 
scenarios that arrest me – between the protagonists in the scene, and also between me and what I 
view. The diﬀerence from when I make photographic portraits is that then I need an invitation to 
step in, to directly participate. I move from being a witness of something that wasn’t intended to 
include me, to being one of the protagonists in the encounter that I set up in front of my camera. 
84.  Baudelaire, 17.
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So how does that feeling connect to my interest in portrait photography? Can writing down 
moments where something happened within me assist me in defining what it is, that elusive 
quality of connectedness I am looking for in my work? Help me move towards an understanding 
of the photographic encounter through the medium of language. In my next practice project I 
continued stripping away elements from the artistic expression, thinking through Georges Didi-
Huberman’s idea of the rend. 
2.6.3 Practice III, Down 
Site-specific HD projection, 10 minute loop, freestanding screen placed on floor of the basement of a 
disused fire station on 1 Chiltern Street, London, as part of the exhibition Breathing Space.85
A long, slow pan. Following seams, the lines in-between. Moving from the domestic interiors 
of the upper floors, oﬀ-limits to the exhibition audicence, down, through the building, ending 
where the walls meet the rubberized basement floor in the former gym. The last pan follows 
an imaginary line in the wall hidden behind the projection screen. A series of vertical scans, as 
opposed to the more habitual horizontal scan of a room we undertake upon entering, the work 
attempts to evoke the closed-oﬀ space and those having occupied it. 
 
The seams provide me with an in- or out– point. As the camera scans along, each incident becomes 
an event, each mark, stain, crack or screw arresting us. I am thinking of Didi-Huberman, and 
his ideas about the ground of certainty crumbling and anything becoming possible. “We are 
entering into a trance-like state, a dream space.”86  The point at which the surface has been 
violated allows us to enter into the image, establishing and connecting intimacy and distance. 
To grant face, to portray a surface. Is that to make a portrait of an inanimate building? Agamben 
claims that:
85.   Curated by Rose LeJeune, 23rd of May until 15th of June 2008. A group of 7 consisting of artists, a dancer, an 
architect, and a composer did a residency in the empty building making work in response to the space.
86.   Georges Didi-Huberman, Confronting Images: Questioning the Ends of a Certain History of Art. N edition, 
(University Park, Pa.: Penn State University Press, 2009), 148.
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There is a face wherever something reaches the level of exposition and tries to grasp its own being 
exposed, wherever a being that appears sinks in that appearance and has to find a way out of it. (Thus, 
art can give a face even to an inanimate object, to a still nature.)87 
Raymond Hains once said about his work, “My works existed before me, but nobody had 
seen them, because they were blindingly obvious.”88 Rather than what Hains did, however – 
appropriating pre-existing tableaux within the urban landscape and exhibiting them – I want 
to look at the overlooked. To enhance vision. To instil a sense of visual seduction as the camera 
pans slowly down cracks and seams, wallpaper unravelling. I become a scopic interpreter of 
signs inscribed in the building, looking for evidence of presence. Could it be called a kind of 
portraiture through metonymy, as Rosy Martin describes her process of photographing the house 
she grew up in?89
A sound of humming as one enters the installation creates a sense of confusion as to whether 
the sound that can be heard is part of the room or part of the building, perhaps originating 
somewhere behind the screen. Only when the first clip changes, and the pitch of the low 
humming subtly shifts, does it become clear that it is in fact part of the work. The sound, 
an electrical meter whirring, is intended as a marker of temporality, enhancing the time-based 
properties of the work. It also increases the sense that the spectator is moving through a space, 
towards the final point in the basement. Susan Stewart talks about the “silence of the ordinary”90 
in relation to the temporality of the everyday. At the same time “ongoing and reversible”, and 
predictable and repetitive as pages falling oﬀ a calendar, the electrical meter whirring, steadily 
approaching higher and higher numbers. Stewart claims that this type of keeping count, or 
signifying, is drowned by the aforementioned silence of the ordinary. In this way our awareness 
of time passing is reinforced.91 
Working in this way gave me a chance to catch my own breath, as it were. Making work through 
87.   Giorgio Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics. Translated by Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 92.
88.  Christopher Masters, “Raymond Hains.” The Guardian, December 6, 2005.
89.  Rosy Martin, “‘Too close to Home? – an Exploration of a Specific Semi-Detached Suburban House.’” Visual 
Urbanism Conference, Goldsmiths University, 2008.
90.  Susan Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection. 10 edition, 
(Durham: Duke University Press Books, 1992), 14.
91.  Ibid., 14.
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an empatic relation with others, strangers, come at a cost. Relating, mirroring, intense listening 
demands my energy, my full attention. The walls of an abandoned building are less exigent. 
Here I am allowed to look without having to relate, to answer. To show empathy or be privy 
to emotional contagion. Giving me freedom to make a work where I do not have to answer to 
the wishes of the person/persons portrayed. The walls do have an ability to invoke an empathic 
reaction in me, but they don't demand a response.  In this way the work Down acts as a space,  a 
chance to recover before the next piece. 
I am thinking of the interior surface of a building in the same terms as the surface of the faces 
I normally work with. I recall a meeting with a very young infant, who, when I held him in 
my arms, reached out towards the openings in my face – mouth, nostrils – as if wanting to 
enter them. Then doing the reverse, opening his little mouth wide whilst facing my face, as if 
attempting to eat me, to make me enter through the hole in his face. The desire reappears, to 
breach the skin containing us, to connect inside and outside once more. In the following chapter 
I will look at how our insides and outsides are connected, within ourselves and to others, through 
an exploration of empathy. 
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3. The Empathic Encounter
And I go to bed, proud to have lived and to have suﬀered in some one besides myself. 
Charles Baudelaire92
Empathy has re-emerged as a topic of interest to researchers in a broad range of fields, and, 
alongside this, there has been new interest in phenomenology and early 20th-century thinking.93 
If the previous chapter helped define empathy as crucial for my desire to both look at and make 
photographic portraiture, I now want to explore whether some of the recent research in the field 
can tell me something of how I, as a photographer, interact with my subjects during the process of 
creating portraits? And, moreover, help me understand how and why we engage with lens-based 
representations of the human face? Interestingly enough, many researchers use visual stimuli – 
photographs or video clips – rather than real live faces, when investigating both empathy and 
face-to-face interaction.
 
I will start this chapter by giving a brief historical overview of the word empathy. I will then take a 
look at what phenomenology has to say about empathy, before exploring some current research. 
This has two strands – neuroscientific theories of mirror neurons and psychological research 
focusing on emotional contagion and facial mirroring.
Empathy is crucial both for the making and for the understanding of my practice. A scene which 
triggers an emotional engagement in one person can be met with total blankness from the person 
next to them. Just as Baudelaire, upon being touched by the sight of a poor family, turned to his 
lover, but, instead of seeing his own compassion reflected in her eyes, saw only annoyance and 
impatience that her view had been constricted.94 But how can we define empathy? The concept 
92.  Baudelaire, Windows, 76.
93.  See See Karsten R Stueber, Rediscovering Empathy, (Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 2010) and Decety 
and Ickes 2009; Eisenberg and Strayner 1990, Davis 2008
94.  Ibid, 84.
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is both subjective and hypothetical95 – an intangible phenomenon and therefore diﬃcult to 
translate into a simple descriptive term. As we will see, the word empathy has, right from its 
inception, been used to evoke related yet distinct phenomena. Most researchers today, however, 
invoke it hoping it will provide answers to the question How can one know what another person 
is thinking and feeling? Some might also be interested in the follow-up question What leads 
one person to respond with sensitivity and care to another?96 A useful contemporary definition of 
empathy can be borrowed from Jean Decety "the natural capacity to share, understand, and 
respond with care to the aﬀective states of others".97
3.1 From Einfühlung to Empathy
Although the root of the term is Greek (ein+patein, to suﬀer), the term empathy is surprisingly 
recent, originally appearing as Einfühlung in the study of aesthetics in late 19th-century Germany. 
Interestingly enough, it first came into being to denote the transference of moods or feelings 
into a piece of art by the artist, or from a piece of art to the viewer. German philosopher Rober 
Vischer is credited with inventing the word, first written in his doctoral thesis ‘On the Optical 
Sense of Form: A Contribution to Aesthetics’ in 1873. With the term Einfühlung (‘feeling-
in’ or ‘feeling-into’), Visher tried to describe the physical responses generated in the viewer by 
observing paintings or sculptures. He spoke of how certain forms awake a certain set of feelings 
in the viewer.98 A dreamer’s body “unconsciously projects its own bodily form – and with it also 
the soul – into the form of the object”. 
95.  Baaren, Decety, Djiksterhuis et al. Being Imitated: Consequences of Nonconsciously Showing Empathy in Decety, 
Jean, Decety and William Ickes, eds. The Social Neuroscience of Empathy. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2011), 
41.
96.  Daniel C Batson "These Things Called Empathy: Eight Related but Distinct Phenomena" in Jean Decety and 
William Ickes, eds. The Social Neuroscience of Empathy, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2011), 4.
97. Decety, Jean. Empathy: From Bench to Bedside. MIT Press, 2012. vii. 
98.  Robert Visher, R. (1873), ‘Uber Das Optische Formgefühl: Ein Beiträg zur Ästethik, Gredner’  quoted in 
David Freedberg and Vittorio Gallese. “Motion, Emotion and Empathy in Esthetic Experience.” Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences 11, no. 5 (May 2007)
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He concludes: “From this I derived the notion that I call ‘empathy’ (Einfühlung).”99  I would like 
to return to this original meaning of the term, describing embodied reactions to artworks, but 
also extend it towards the modern definition of empathy as an ability to understand and share 
emotional states of others. Can my empathic connection to the subjects of my work translate 
into an artwork that will allow the viewers to feel-into the work? Creating an empathic resonance 
that reverberates from the original encounter between photographer and subject, through to the 
represented moment, and finally coming to a halt in the viewer. 
Supporting Visher’s view, philosopher Theodore Lipps, professor at the University of Munich, 
picked up the term when describing the relationship between a work of art and the viewer. A 
person contemplating Goya’s The Horror of War, for example, would, according to Lipps, be 
prone to feeling the pain of the contorted tortured body represented in the painting. Later, he 
extended the concept to include how we can intersubjectively understand each other, broadening 
the term from simply referring to the artwork–person dyad to encompass the person–person 
relationship, whereby direct observation of someone in pain will make me feel myself in him 
(fühle mich so in ihm).100 
Lipps went on to describe this feeling as bodily experience rather than rational, though. In 1907 
he wrote an article where he argued that gestures and expressions show our emotions, but the 
relationship between what is felt and how it is shown is a particular one, much diﬀerent, for 
example, from how smoke signals fire.101 According to Lipps, we imitate expressions when we 
see them, and this act of mirroring or reproduction makes us partake in the emotions expressed 
by the gestures. This is something that comes by instinct for humans, he claimed, an instinct for 
empathy that involves dual drives: one directed towards imitation and one towards expression. 
The feeling evoked in myself by the expression I mirror, I re-attribute to the other through a 
process of projection, and in this way I reach an understanding of the other. 
99.  Benjamin Morgan, “Critical Empathy: Vernon Lee’s Aesthetics and the Origins of Close Reading,” (October 17, 
2014.) 4. https://www.academia.edu/3163737/Critical_Empathy_Vernon_Lees_Aesthetics_and_the_Origins_of_
Close_Reading.
100.  Theodore Lipps quoted in Vittorio Gallese, “The ‘Shared Manifold’ Hypothesis: From Mirror Neurons to 
Empathy.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 8, no. 5–7 (2001), 43.
101.  Theodore Lipps quoted in Dan Zahavi, “Empathy and Mirroring: Husserl and Gallese.” In Life, Subjectivity & 
Art, edited by Roland Breeur and Ullrich Melle, 217–54. Phaenomenologica 201. Springer Netherlands, 2012. 222. 
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Described in these terms, empathy appears as a cumbersome process. No wonder, then, that 
Lipps saw empathy as limited. The only mental states we can infer from others are those we 
ourselves feel. We cannot detect or decode a feeling we ourselves have not felt. We are restricted 
by ourselves, as we need to use our own inner experience to move from what we see to what 
we feel.102 I think of my own experience, particularly of tutoring students. Often there seems 
to be an inverse relation, where those most harsh and unforgiving towards themselves show 
greatest empathy for others. And, at the other end of the scale, are those acutely attuned to their 
own needs and emotions, demanding a space where their emotions will be accounted for and 
understood, but less able to give space to the emotions of others.
So, if feeling something yourself doesn’t necessarily lead you to understanding the feelings of 
others, and we define empathy as that which leads us to understand the inner life of others, 
Lipp’s description of the interpersonal process is perhaps more accurate for describing emotional 
contagion. Emotional contagion – coming to share the emotions of another person – is not 
simply a question of correctly recognizing the emotions of the other: the same emotions also 
need to fill the empathizer. Sometimes the occasions when a shared feeling occurs are referred 
to as instances of sympathy rather than empathy, a useful distinction to my mind. 103  We could 
also say that sympathy is more focused on the other’s state as something that can be addressed 
and alleviated, whereas empathy is focused on understanding the other’s subjective experience 
or state of mind.104  Therefore, I believe empathy rather than sympathy is the correct term to 
describe the interaction between me and whoever stands before my lens, and the emotional 
connection between artwork and viewer. 
So it follows that there are several reactive emotions that may come into play under the umbrella 
term empathy, and they are primarily divided by whether they are self- or other-oriented, or 
if they presuppose awareness between self and other. In the following section I will explore 
some phenomenological perspectives on the intersubjective meeting, which ties into the previous 
chapter on The Face.
102.  Ibid., 222-223
103.  See Bateson, 6.
104.  Lauren Wispé, “The Distinction between Sympathy and Empathy: To Call Forth a Concept, a Word Is 
Needed.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 50, no. 2 (1986), 314. 
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3.2 Phenomenological Perspectives on Empathy
Just like photographers use the camera as a filter between ourselves and lived experience, helping 
us to makes sense of the world, phenomenologists like Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty believe that we all use our bodies in our connection and communication with others. 
Husserl constructs empathy as a direct empirical experience, which allows us to gain access to 
another’s consciousness. 
 
 The other is given to me originally in empathy, for what I see is not a sign, not a mere analogue, but  
 rather the other. If I talk with another, if I look him in the eyes, I have the liveliest experience of his  
 immediate presence. I am justified in saying that I ‘see him’ qua person, and not merely qua body.105  
The idea that we can see another person’s consciousness, if you like, is a sentiment that is echoed 
in how many portrait photographers discuss their work. Being able to see the person, or, indeed, 
capture the contained through a photograph of their bodily form. And through this meeting 
between oneself and others we are, according to Husserl, able to encounter true transcendence, 
all the while the other always remaining absolutely other to me, as I do to him. The distinction 
between empathy and sympathy again, that of seeing, recognizing, experiencing, but always 
knowing what pertains to the other and what pertains to me. 
Merleau-Ponty puts it beautifully in The Phenomenology of Perception: 
The sense of the other is not given, but understood, that is, recaptured by an act on the spectator’s part. 
The whole diﬃculty is to conceive this act clearly without confusing it with a cognitive operation. The 
communication or comprehension of gestures comes about through the reciprocity of my intentions 
and the gestures of others, of my gestures and intentions discernible in the conduct of other people. It 
is as if the other person’s intention inhabited my body and mine his. 106 
Perhaps it is here the magic of photography lies – in the ability of another person, another lived 
experience, to reach out through time and space and inhabit my body. 
In the same way, Emmanuel Levinas sees the meeting with the other as embodied rather than 
cognitive. Lingis explains Levinas’s position:
The other … communicates not only the sense of his postures and gestures but also the sense of his 
105.  Husserl quoted in Zahavi, 228
106.  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception: An Introduction. 2 edition. (London; New Maurice. 
York: Routledge, 2002), 215.
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scowls, murmurs, sighs, utterances and coded words to me by ordering their reproduction in me, by 
ordering my body with his.107 
But it is not a straightforward process – phenomenology describes the meeting with another as 
fundamentally contradictory. I see the other both as an object in the world and as a subject, with 
her own thoughts and perspective. We cannot separate that which is expressed from expression 
itself. Merleau-Ponty says about the lived body that it is “our expression in the world, the visible 
form of our intentions”108 and we cannot get away from that being so – every use of our bodies is 
expression. When I smile, my smile is not separated from the joy I feel, but rather an integral part 
of it, or two diﬀerent manifestations of the same phenomenon. But we can encounter expressions 
that seem insincere to us, empty or false. How do those kinds of expressions, characterized by a 
discrepancy between inner and outer, sit within this schema?
Lisa Folkmarsson Käll writes in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s thoughts: “When I encounter a 
smiling face that does not seem to display joy, but rather, a lack thereof, I do not in fact only 
experience a discrepancy between inside and outside, but also an identity.”109 The empty smiling 
face comes to signify precisely the lack of joy, and therefore embodies the underlying feeling 
which eludes me. At the same time, this discrepancy and room for ambiguity between inside 
and outside indicates that the relationship between inner and outer expression is not a simple, 
direct one. Rather, there is an incessant interlacing and unfolding of what we like to place on 
the inside or the outside of the face. In this way, faces and their expressions confound us, at the 
same time as they remind us that the division between inside and outside is less clear than we 
would expect. And not only the division between inside and outside – in our relation to others 
we are “embodied and embedded in the world”110,  as we, from the very beginnings of life, come 
into being through our relationship with others. Therefore, we can never have pure subjectivity 
removed from others.
There is something here, in relation to photography. A thought about surface and depth that 
resonates. The surface of the print/the surface of the represented face – and what lies behind, 
107.  Lingis, 128.
108.  Merleau-Ponty, 5
109.   Lisa Folkmarsson Käll, “Expressive Space: Encountering Self and Other,” Centre for Gender Research, 
Uppsala university, n.d. 4. http://philosophy.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/philosophy.columbian.gwu.edu/files/image/
Kall_gwu_presentation.pdf.
110  Ibid., 6.
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hidden from view. But also what reaches out, and fills that gap between the viewer and the flat 
representation. Another interlacing and unfolding. But, although I can interpret the expressions 
on the reproduced face, I can never know the mind in its entirety, and it will constantly elude 
my grasp, or my full understanding. 
I think back to August Sander and that most noble of ambitions for a portrait photographer: 
“to create pictures that reproduce the people concerned with unconditional veracity and reflect 
their whole psychology.”111 No, I am afraid we need to settle for less. Or? Perhaps not less. 
Just diﬀerent. “In his flesh I see not only the anonymity and susceptibility of his want but the 
demanding insistence of his being.” 112 Isn’t this approaching what portraits do? Demanding to 
be acknowledged precisely on account of being – or having once been – alive? It reminds me of 
a strange medical case described by Merleau-Ponty, a man who constantly felt the need to turn 
around to check that the world remained there, behind his back .113 Perhaps those of us aﬄicted 
by another strange compulsion – that of photographing the faces of strangers – similarly both 
need and find proof that the world around us exists when we find ourselves confronted with this 
insistence for recognition.
Hence, the phenomenologists see the intersubjective embodied meeting as fundamental for 
empathy. But how does that relate to current thinking within neuroscience and psychology? 
How compatible are they, and which can tell us more of how we interact with each other and 
with images? In the following section I will make use of multiple discourses investigating the 
process whereby we understand others.
111.  August Sander quoted in Regener, 52.
112.   Lingis, 138.
113.   Merleau-Ponty, 486.
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3.3 Empathy Today
Lately there has been a renewed interest in the concept of empathy, led in part by advances in brain 
imaging technologies.114With the technological improvements within cognitive neuroscience, 
specifically the advent of fMRI scanning, the cognitive and aﬀective processes that come into 
play when people experience empathy have begun to be traced within the human brain. From 
neuroscientists working with mirror neurons to psychologists working with emotion psychology, 
a wide variety of research projects have increased our understanding of empathy. Even though 
much remains to be discovered about our brains and the neural underpinnings of the way we 
connect with and interpret others, a window has been opened which allows us to begin to 
understand the process whereby we connect to and interact with other humans.
Empathy is a fundamental tool for humans, as much of our social life is based on our capacity 
to accurately detect emotional information transmitted by another person. Current research 
indicates that our empathic capacity is innate, and that already as toddlers we are able to extrapolate 
the intentions and feelings of others. In 1921 Sigmund Freud proposed that “A path leads from 
identification by way of imitation to empathy, that is to the comprehension of the mechanism 
by which we are enabled to take up any attitude at all towards another mental life.”115  It is not 
uncommon for a newborn child to start crying when she hears another baby cry, and babies 
commonly mirror the facial expressions of their caregivers. Adults also mimic facial expressions, 
even when interacting with photographs of happy or angry faces116 and automatically mimic the 
postures and gestures of people with whom they interact. Such unconscious imitation tends to 
increase liking and bonding between individuals – serving as a kind of natural ‘social glue.’117 
114.  See Karsten R Stueber, Rediscovering Empathy, (Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 2010)
115.  Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and The Analysis of The Ego, Translated by James Strachey, (2011), 108.  
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/35877?msg=welcome_stranger.
116.  Per Andréasson and Ulf Dimberg. “Emotional Empathy and Facial Feedback.” Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 
32, no. 4 (December 2008): 215–24. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10919-008-0052-z.
117.  E Morsella, J.A. Bargh, J Decety and J.T Cacioppo "Unconscious Action Tendencies: Sources of “Un-
integrated Action”  in eds. John T Cacioppo and Jean Decety, The Oxford Handbook of Social Neuroscience. 1st ed. 
(Oxford University Press, 2011), 341. 
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I will return to research around mimicking processes further along, but first I will explore what is 
arguably the most important scientific theory of empathy to emerge over recent decades: mirror 
neurons. These findings are relatively recent and therefore still contested – some claim fMRI 
scans are no more able to generate correct data than physiognomy once was.118 But, nonetheless, 
it is useful to explore the new theories around empathy and embodied interaction that have 
emerged over recent decades .
3.4 Mirror Neurons
Neurophysiologist Giacomo Rizzolatto and his team at the University of Parma discovered 
mirror neurons quite by chance in their laboratory during the 1990s, while conducting research 
on macaque monkeys. The researchers found that the same neurons fired in the monkeys’ brains 
when they observed an action as when they executed the action. (For instance, picking up a nut, 
or watching a researcher pick up a nut.)119 Subsequently, the same system was found in human 
brains,120 a discovery sometimes called the most important since the isolation of DNA.121 
I will not explain in detail how mirror neurons work from a biological perspective, nor exactly 
what parts of the brain are involved, as that level of biological detail will not add to how we 
understand making and viewing photographic portraits. I will instead give an overview of the 
knowledge generated by their discovery, and outline what, if any, insights into photographic 
portraiture that can be suggested as a result. Mirror neuron systems (MNS) are not confined to 
the domain of action (as in movement), but also encompass other aspects of intersubjectivity 
118.   I notice that we still look towards images for finding out who we really are, but now they are scans of brains 
rather than photographs of faces. We have got used to seeing articles on a wide range of topics illustrated by images 
of dark brains with yellow, green and red illuminated blotches, images used as proof. But how do we know how 
to interpret them? I remain wary of neurobabble: popular science that tends to present complex questions as a 
compelling and neatly narrated story.
119.   Giacomo Rizzolatti and Corrado Sinigaglia, “The Functional Role of the Parieto-Frontal Mirror Circuit: 
Interpretations and Misinterpretations.” Nature Neuroscience 11, no. April 2010.
120.  Research on birds shows that they also have mirror neurons, but it is not known yet which other species they 
may exist in.
121.   V.S Ramachandran, “Mirror Neurons and Imitation Learning as the Driving Force behind ‘the Great Leap 
Forward’ in Human Evolution.” From the Third Culture: http://www .edge.or g/3rd_culture/, n.d.
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such as emotions and sensations. In short, they link action execution and action perception in 
our brains. It seems to be a process whereby one individual can understand the actions of another 
individual from inside his own body, as it were, and gives the observing individual a first-person 
grasp of the motor goals and intentions of another individual.122  
This is fascinating to consider when thinking about gladiator games, public executions and the 
like. Do we empathise with the executioner or the executed? What about violent films? Perhaps 
it is not uncommon among highly sensitive people to find it unbearable to watch this kind of 
material. Here, an article written by a mathematician behind one of the UK’s most popular 
dating sites comes to mind. They found that the factor that most closely predicted the chances 
for long-term happiness of couples that had been matched on their website was whether they 
answered identically the question “do you enjoy scary movies?” – 75% of long-term couples 
answered the same way, despite the question statistically splitting their user group in half.123 
Perhaps how we respond to violent stimuli says something about deeper levels of our personality, 
and our ability to feel empathy. 
In the same way, mirror neurons have been shown to respond to actions that look as if they 
are about to be executed. Therefore, they can be said to help us understand others’ implied 
actions, even in those instances when we do not see them being carried out.124 According to 
neurophysicist Vittorio Gallese, “I understand the action of the other because it is an action I 
could perform myself.”125  Gallese goes on to claim that a wide range of interpersonal relations 
depend on automatic or embodied knowledge. We don’t just see others, what they do and their 
displayed emotions, we also receive an internal representation of the body states linked to the 
other’s actions and emotions, just as if we were performing a similar action ourselves. The motor 
system is active in the same area, both when we act and when we watch someone else acting. 
Only parts of our brain are connected to others in this way, however. A subset of mirror neurons 
inhibits our feelings, for instance feelings of sadness when we observe someone else displaying 
122.  Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 264.
123.   Christian Rudder, “Seven Secrets of Dating from the Experts at OkCupid.” The Guardian, September 28, 
2014, sec. Life and style. http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2014/sep/28/seven-secrets-of-dating-from-the-
experts-at-okcupid.
124.  Freedberg and Gallese, 200.
125.  Vittorio Gallese, “The ‘Shared Manifold’ Hypothesis: From Mirror Neurons to Empathy.” Journal of 
Consciousness Studies 8, no. 5–7 (2001), 36.
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sad expressions. “I share the emotion but I don’t feel it.”126  The same occurs when we see the 
body of someone else being touched. In this way we can share actions, intentions, feelings and 
emotions with others, which in turn gives us an understanding of the mental state of others.127 
Embodied simulation, then, is beginning to take form as a discourse around empathy within 
the field of neuroscience, headed by Gallese and Rizzolatti. But how much can mirror-resonance 
mechanisms really explain? Is mirror-resonance merely the basis for interpersonal understanding 
and empathy, or does it explain the phenomenon in its entirety? Borg and Jacob both propose 
that, while mirror-neurons help us understand the other’s motor intentions, they do not help 
us understand why the other made a movement, i.e. the prior intentions.128  For instance, while 
mirror neurons might be able to tell us that the person in front of us is trying to grab a pen, they 
cannot tell us why the person is trying to grab the pen. 
All in all, it seems that we cannot at this early stage determine how much and exactly what 
mirror neurons can explain in terms of empathy. It is possible there needs to be some kind of 
mentalizing skill for empathy to function properly. (As opposed to the ‘automatic’ knowledge 
garnered through embodied simulation.) Gallese, Rizzolatti and Keysers go as far as defining 
empathy as always involving a form of embodied simulation, and claims that empathy therefore 
gives us direct access to the subjectivity of the other in a non-conscious manner:
When we read fiction or see a movie or a play or even when we see a painting, we map these fictional 
beings’ actions, emotions and sensations onto our brain’s visceral motor and sensory representations that 
account for our emotional experience, which comes before our cognitive experience.129 
Marco Iacobini, professor of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences at UCLA, sums up the research 
on mirror neurons with the statement that their discovery seems to explain why phenomenologists 
were correct in their model of empathy.130 Because of a shared bodily representational format, 
we map the actions of others onto our own motor representations, as well as others’ sensations 
126.  Vittorio Gallese:“From Mirror Neurons to Embodied Simulation” Part 1, 2012. Lecture at the Arnold Pfeﬀer 
Centre for Neuropsychoanalysis at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. 
127.  Gallese, 2001. 44-45.
128.  Zahavi, 246.
129.  Vittorio Gallese, Christian Keysers, and Giacomo Rizzolatti. “A Unifying View of the Basis of Social 
Cognition.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8, no. 9 (September 2004), 396. 
130.   Marco Iacoboni, Mirroring People: The Science of Empathy and How We Connect with Others. Original edition, 
(New York, N.Y.: Picador, 2009), 262.
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and emotions onto our own motor representations. The ensuing intercorporeality describes a 
crucial aspect of intersubjectivity. Iacobini goes onto say that “the mirroring and the mirrored are 
always linked in a reciprocal situation”131, a quote that brings both Levinas and Merleau-Ponty 
to mind, and perhaps phenomenology lies beneath the neuroscience of empathy like a shadow, 
influencing how leading proponents of mirror neurons conceptualize their discoveries. 
Consequently, just as Levinas and Merleau-Ponty resonate strongly within my art practice, so 
do theories of mirror neurons and what they can suggest both in terms of understanding our 
responses to photographic portraits, and to the portraiture situation. Can mirror-neurons suggest 
answers as to why photographic portraits are such powerful communicators? In the next chapter 
I will look at some research investigating mirror neurons in relation to viewing artworks. 
3.4.1 Art and Mirror Neurons
If theories of mirror neurons are correct, we systematically use our bodies as a kind of filter 
through which we attempt to make sense of the world, and the worlds of others. Aesthetic 
experiences can be characterized as a form of intersubjectivity, mediated through the work of the 
artist.132 Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has shown how our feelings (the conscious awareness 
of emotions) are connected with our bodies through what he calls an ‘as-if body loop’, whereby 
diﬀerent areas in observers’ brains react by assuming the same state they would have had if 
the observers of actions or emotions had been engaged in the same action, or if they had been 
put in the same situations that they observed.133 For example, when we observe a painting or 
photograph that scares us, we don’t run away, but our brain simulates or reproduces the somatic 
states seen in the image as if we were really present in the scene. 
This manifold relationship between image and beholder is something Gallese has explored 
further, together with renowned art historian David Freedberg. 
131.  Quoted by Gallese, 2012:1
132.  Freedberg and Gallese, 200-203.
133.  Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain. (London: Vintage, 2006)
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They propose that viewing both the world and artworks is a highly complex process, as it involves 
a “multi-modal notion of vision”134 involving many diﬀerent areas of our brain, rather than the 
activation of simply ‘the visual part’. Just like Damasio, they believe that we react to images 
just as we react to the world around us. Even though these mechanisms may be socioculturally 
modulated, in essence they are universal, so understanding our embodied reaction to images can 
therefore help us understand how they aﬀect us – everyday imagery as well as works of art. This is 
perhaps especially poignant today, when visual communication through still and moving images 
becomes more and more central online and in much-used mobile messaging applications. 
David Freedberg co-operated with a team of neuroscientists on a specific study exploring neural 
reactions to viewing ‘slashed’ abstract paintings by Lucio Fontana. Their result was that the 
cuts elicited a diﬀerent motor reaction within the subject’s brain than the test image consisting 
simply of lines replacing the cut. The consistent result showed an embodied aspect to the 
aesthetic experience in the subjects. “The cuts on the canvas are the visible traces of goal-directed 
movements, hence capable of activating the relevant motor areas in the observers’ brains.”135 
With relevant movements, the scientists refer to the kind of actions you would need to physically 
slash a canvas with a knife. In this way “the artwork becomes the mediator of the motor and 
emotional resonance arising between the artist and observer.”136 It makes the beholder feel that 
which is beheld in an embodied, non-verbal manner. Therefore, Gallese and  Freedberg posit that 
embodied simulation plays a vital role in our interest and appreciation of art. 
As a visual artist I find these ideas utterly compelling. Decisions intuitively made in the studio 
or in the cutting room, impossible to verbalize in other ways than ‘it looks right’, seen through 
the eyes of embodied simulation take on a heightened meaning. (Here I would like to include 
a reservation. Will this intuitive working process gain from my increased knowledge of how the 
human brain works? Can neuroscience aid the creation of compelling art? Or will it simply, as 
some fear, explain away the magic we feel when faced with a great work of art?)
 
134.  Vittorio Gallese: Warburg Symposium - Day 1 - Neuroesthetics, 2013. Lecture at the Helix Centre, New York. 
135.  Alessandra M. Umilta’, Cristina Berchio, Mariateresa Sestito, David Freedberg, and Vittorio Gallese. “Abstract 
Art and Cortical Motor Activation: An EEG Study.” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6 (November 16, 2012). 
136.  Vittorio Gallese “The Body in Aesthetic Experience: A Neuroscientific Perspective,” 2012. Lecture at the Centre for 
Sciene, Technology , Medicine & Society at Berkley University, USA. 
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Freedberg and Gallese’s theories are also relevant to consider in relation to footage or photographs 
of inanimate objects. They claim that:
The observation of static graspable objects activates not only visual areas of the brain but also motor 
areas that control object-related actions such as grasping. The observation of graspable objects leads 
to the simulation of the motor act that the object aﬀords. This implies that the same neuron not only 
codes the execution of motor acts but also responds to the visual features that trigger them, even in the 
absence of movement.137
Experiments have shown through brain imaging that watching manipulable objects like tools, 
fruit, vegetables, clothes and, yes, even sexual organs activates the region of our brain normally 
associated with executive functioning (control of action) and not with the representation of 
objects.138  Does this in part hold the key to why visual representation of sexual acts, as in porn, 
can be so gratifying that humans risk becoming addicted? And why watching Nigella dip her 
finger into batter and then lick it gives us enough satisfaction to keep tuning into her 
cookery programmes? “When we see the body part of someone else being touched or 
caressed or when we see two objects touching each other, our somatosensory cortices are 
activated as if our body were subject to tactile stimulation.”139
 
Fig IV      
Fig IV Juliane Eirich, Towel, Itoshima, Japan, 2011
137.  Freedberg and Gallese, 200.
138.  Ibid.
139.  Ibid., 201.
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When viewing the bright yellow towel from German photographer Juliane Eirich’s Itoshima 
series, I imagine reaching out and touching the soft, warm fabric suspended from a hook on a 
nondescript domestic wall. It feels as if it’s waiting for me too to reach out, dry my hands and 
body on its fluﬀy material, and envelop myself into its warm yellow glow. Would an image like 
this be as visually arresting if mirror neurons were not at play? Motor stimulation not triggered? 
Empathy as it was first conceived, Einfühlung?
Gallese has put forward an as-of-yet untested discourse on why embodied meetings with works 
of art are often more compelling than real life. He means that in our meeting with artworks we 
are able to leave reality behind for a moment, and in this way liberate more brainpower for the 
artistic experience. The result is a stronger reaction than we would gain from an experience sited 
in ‘reality.’140 Georg Simmel’s description of the face-to- face meeting comes to mind. 
 The extremely lively interaction into which the look from one eye to another weaves people together  
 does not crystallize in any objective structure, but rather the unity that it creates between them  
 remains directly suspended in the event and in the function. And this connection is so strong and  
 delicate that it can only be supported by the shortest line – the straight line between the eyes – and  
 the smallest deviation from this line, the slightest sideways glance, destroys the uniqueness of this  
 connection completely. 141
Thinking back to what I wrote about looking earlier, it is not often we can or dare keep up this 
kind of intense visual exchange in ‘real life’. Even if we use our cameras as an alibi. That straight 
line is easier to achieve in interaction with a photograph or filmed face, when only the ending of 
the clip (for a moving image example) could disturb the direct eye-to-eye interchange. I also think 
of the process of returning – of looking again. In real-life, moments of face-to-face interaction 
are so fleeting – did I really see…? Wasn’t there a glimmer of…? I can retain the memory of an 
encounter with the real, live face of another, a memory I can revisit through writing, for instance. 
But it is not static, it is slippery – ever-changing. And writing it does not seem to conjure up 
the same level of embodiedness in my response. More reflective, yes, but less situated. To the 
photograph, however, I can return again and again, each time feeling it as if for the first time. 
Those looks that have met mine emanating from a represented face rather than a real-life person 
are therefore easier to invoke. Clearer, more defined. Like so much in artistic creation, a process 
of reduction, a densification of that lively interaction, to paraphrase Simmel, taking place in 
140.  Vittorio Gallese, “The Body in Aesthetic Experience: A Neuroscientific Perspective,” 2012. 
141.  Simmel, 111-112.
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face-to-face meetings. But can they really contain reciprocity, you might ask, those immobile 
eyes of a portrait? Yes, I believe they can, and I take note of the fact that most experiments on 
empathy and face-to-face interaction use photographs or moving image as stimuli, rather than 
actual faces. For practical reasons, no doubt – the encounter between two persons is too slippery 
to be rendered statistically valid – but it points towards a confidence in the power of images to 
test our relation to the face and to each other.
In addition, encounters with the other through art help us maintain concentration, like Gallese 
suggests, calling it “liberated embodied simulation”, where we can be more open to the experience 
as we are able to leave our defensive mechanisms behind, considering we spatially tend to be still, 
or rather still (sitting in an audience, looking at a book, walking through a gallery). We feel safe, 
as there is a distance between the artworks and ourselves. Another reason we can allocate more 
bodily resources towards the processing of what we are beholding. Perhaps we could say that 
the densification occurs on both sides of the interchange between viewer and artwork.  Can this 
help us understand why we feel connected to photographs? Could it be, when Rineke Djikstra 
and August Sander speak of revealing a truth in their sitters, that they are instead engaging in 
an intersubjective embodied mirroring and therefore able to depict a moment of connection 
to the other? But if this is the case, why is it that certain photographers and artists consistently 
manage to create photographs that make me feel an embodied reaction to them, whilst the work 
of others, with a similar subject matter, leaves me only able to appreciate them from a technical 
point of view? 
Despite there being very little neuroscientific research into the individual diﬀerences in how the 
embodied neural networks operate in diﬀerent individuals, Gallese claims to have found that the 
brains of  more “inward types” of people indicate that they both understand and feel when they 
observe another, whereas other, more external types can recognize feelings well but will not share 
them.142 A few diﬀerent researchers have found a connection between high scores on the 
Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index and stronger mirror neuron activity.143 Developmental 
psychologist Mirella Dapretto and her team found compelling evidence that children’s emotional
142.  Gallese Vittorio, “The Body in Aesthetic Experience: A Neuroscientific Perspective,” 2012. 
143.  Claus C. Lamm, Daniel Batson, and Jean Decety, “The Neural Substrate of Human Empathy: Eﬀects of 
Perspective-Taking and Cognitive Appraisal.” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 19, no. 1, 46.
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empathy scores (measured through a questionnaire completed by the parents) and their activity 
in mirror neuron areas during the observation of facial emotional expressions are connected. The 
more empathic the child, the more mirror neurons would become activated. They also showed 
stronger activation of mirror neurons when they were imitating the facial expressions of others.144
If our propensity for sharing the feelings of others can be mapped on a graph, people suﬀering 
from mirror-touch synaesthesia would be found right on the outer edge. Mirror-synaesthetes 
are individuals who can feel touch occurring between other people on their own body by just 
looking.145 They also show a much higher activation of mirror neurons, and score very highly on 
empathy tests. This supports the hypothesis that we empathise with others through a process of 
simulation. It also indicates big individual diﬀerences in the mirror neuron systems of diﬀerent 
individuals.146
Accounts of the heroic behaviour of certain individuals at Utøya, the Norwegian island 
where 77 young people were massacred by Anders Behring Breivik, come to mind: Henrik 
Rasmussen, observing a young girl being shot in the shoulder when trying to escape the 
attack by swimming towards the mainland, and seeing the sharpshooter reload and take 
aim once again, screamed out from his hiding place. In this way he diverted Breivik’s 
attention enough so that the shooter did not fire another bullet into the body of the 
bleeding and desperate girl, but in the process he enabled Breivik’s shotgun to focus on 
himself, instead. As a result, Henrik was killed, and the young girl survived.147 
It makes me wonder if the young man was so empathically connected with the bleeding 
girl in the water that he would do anything for a bullet not to hit her body again, 
eﬀectively sacrificing himself in the process.
144.  Mirella Dapretto, Mari S. Davies, Jennifer H. Pfeifer, Ashley A. Scott, Marian Sigman, Susan Y. Bookheimer, 
and Marco Iacoboni. “Understanding Emotions in Others: Mirror Neuron Dysfunction in Children with Autism 
Spectrum Disorders.” Nature Neuroscience 9, no. 1 (January 2006): 28–30. 
145.  See Siri Hustvelt’s account of living with mirror-touch synaesthesia in The Shaking Woman or A History of My 
Nerves, Picador, New York (2010).
146.  Michael J Banissy and Jamie Ward. “Mirror-Touch Synesthesia Is Linked with Empathy.” Nature Neuroscience 
10, no. 7 (July 2007): 815–16. 
147.  Wenche Fuglehaug, “Heltedod.” Aftonposten. July 19, 2014, sec. 1.
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Despite science and philosophy seeming to converge, the existence of mirror neurons is by 
no means uncontroversial. Various researchers have not been able to find evidence for mirror 
neurons in humans.148 I am in no position to verify or dispute scientific theories, but, as thinking 
around mirror neurons resonates with my own experience of both viewing and making art, and 
my thinking through of meetings between myself and others, I do believe the existence of mirror 
neurons proposes a compelling theory of intersubjectivity. Even if it was proven to be wrong, or 
at best an oversimplification, in 20 years’ time, it has brought the discourse around empathy and 
embodied interaction to the surface. 
Two complementary but diﬀerent propositions have been put forward by proponents of mirror 
neurons – that they help us understand what the other is feeling and make us share that feeling. 
Gallese is in one respect very clear that mirror neurons do not engender feelings of sympathy, i.e. 
feeling it yourself, but having read extensively on mirror neurons I consider that the diﬀerentiation 
between the two still seems vague. If individuals with mirror synaesthesia, who score very highly 
on empathy scores and have been found to have overactive mirror neurons can be called ‘super-
empaths’, surely mirror neurons ought to have something to do with also feeling the pain of the 
other. Gallese’s anecdotal observations on the diﬀerences he has come across in the brains of 
introverts versus extroverts in terms of recognizing and feeling, in conjunction with Dapretto’s 
research on children, seem to point towards large individual diﬀerences in our brains. Our 
particular brain-make-up, if you like, would surely then aﬀect both how we make art involving 
others, and how receptive we are as audience for artworks. In the following chapter I will look 
at some other theories regarding human–human interaction, specifically emotional contagion. 
Not simply recognizing the emotion of the other, but also coming to feel as the other does. I will 
move from what happens inside our brain to the outside, the face; from neuroscience to social 
psychology, looking at some of the most cited research within human interaction studies.
148.  Angelika Lingnau,  Benno Gesierich, and Alfonso Caramazza. “Asymmetric fMRI Adaptation Reveals No 
Evidence for Mirror Neurons in Humans.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, no. 24 (June 16, 
2009): 9925–30. 
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3.5 Empathy and Emotions 
We are made through others. 
   Siri Hustveldt149 
Both human beings and our closest animal relations have been given a specialized organ, our 
face, to convey our feelings and emotions to those surrounding us. Recognizing and correctly 
interpreting emotion is very important, both as a tool for understanding and making sense of 
the behaviour of others, and also because it enables us to understand the impact on others of our 
own behaviour, providing us with a mirror, in a sense, in which we can see our own behaviour. 150
Emotion recognition, according to social scientists Ralph Adolphs and Vanessa Janowski, can be 
defined as a series of processes whereby we attempt to reconstruct the inner workings of another 
being. In order to do so we use a series of clues available to us: tone of voice, facial expressions, 
body language, actions and other contextual and historical information we are party to. Adolphs 
and Janowski define emotion recognition as a highly active process. A series of interactive 
behaviours underpin our ability to recognize emotion in others, from probing the other with 
a glance and then registering their response, to directly asking a question.151 Neuroscientific 
research, on the other hand, has a tendency to be unidirectional in scope, content with tracking 
the neurological processes in only one of the parties in interpersonal meetings. This is no doubt 
largely down to how studies tend to be set up. But it is an important area to research in the 
future, and, of course, very much relevant for what happens within the photographic meeting, 
where two people interact. (Currently, most of the existing research is closer to the relationship 
and emotional contagion happening between a photographic portrait and a viewer.)
149.  Siri Hustvedt, The Shaking Woman or A History of My Nerves, (New York: Picador, 2010), 92.
150.  Ralph Adolphs and Vanessa Janowski Emotion Recognition in Decety, Jean, and John T. Cacioppo. The Oxford 
Handbook of Social Neuroscience. 1 edition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 252.
151.  Ibid.
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3.6 Mimicry/Facial Feedback Hypothesis
Humans’ tendency to mimic each other and automatically synchronize postures, expressions, 
vocalizations and even emotions has been termed emotional contagion.152 Thinking around the 
reciprocal emotional influence of one person on another has run parallel to the development 
of the empathy concept,153 but let’s try to consider the diﬀerence between the two. Whereas 
empathy is the ability to understand another’s subjective experience or state of mind, whilst 
remaining in one’s own perspective, as I wrote earlier, emotional contagion implies that our own 
perspective changes. Our emotional state shifts as a direct result of observing the emotional state 
of another. (Is emotional contagion something that happens more before the camera, I wonder? 
Whereas empathy is more apt for describing the relationship between artwork and viewer?)
In 1872 Charles Darwin published The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. (A 
book all of us interested in the history of photography and portraiture know well thanks to the 
photographic illustrations created by Duchenne de Boulogne and Oscar Rejlander. But that is 
another story.) Darwin proposed that emotional experience is directly influenced by feedback 
from the facial muscles. If we freely express our emotions, they will be intensified, whereas 
supressing the outwards manifestation of our emotions will soften them. So, if you express 
violent gestures your rage will increase; if you show signs of fear you will become more afraid; 
and, finally, “he who remains passive when overwhelmed with grief loses his best chance of 
recovering elasticity of mind.”154 A viewpoint shared by many of his time and culture, no doubt, 
embedded in the ideal of the British stiﬀ upper lip. 
Psychologist James Laird tested Darwin’s hypothesis in an experiment whereby subjects were told 
that facial muscle activity was to be measured. Their faces were fitted with electrodes and then 
rearranged to mimic naturally occurring facial expressions, much like Duchenne de 
152.  Elaine Hatfield, John T. Cacioppo and Richard L Rapson Emotional Contagion. (Cambridge England; New 
York: Paris: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 97.
153.  An early proponent of a theory of emotional contagion was economic philosopher Adam Smith, noting 
that, as people imagined themselves in another’s situation, they displayed motor mimicry. Later, Theodor Lipps 
claimed that observation of emotional displays led to mimicry, and furthermore that a feedback process created a 
convergence between observed and felt emotional states. 
154.  Charles DarwinThe Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. (CreateSpace Independent Publishing 
Platform, 2012), 365.
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Boulogne once arranged his subjects. Afterwards, the subjects were asked how they felt during 
the experiment. One man answered: 
When my jaw was clenched and my brows down, I tried not to be angry but it just fit the position. I’m 
not in any angry mood but I found my thoughts wandering to things that made me angry, which is sort 
of silly I guess. I knew I was in an experiment and knew I had no reason to feel that way, but I just lost 
control.155  
This seems to indicate that facial feedback between expressions and felt emotions do occur. 
So what does that mean for portraiture, and my work? I don’t ask my subjects to take on a 
particular expression. Nonetheless, it becomes interesting in relation to the mirroring that 
occurs in interpersonal relationships. As we know, infants begin to mimic their caregivers shortly 
after birth, and continue to do so throughout their lifetime. This process is incredibly fast; 
research on college students found that the students could synchronize their movements within 
21 milliseconds (the time of one picture frame).156 This strongly indicates a non-conscious, 
embodied synchronization.157 
We also know that people have variable ability to express emotions facially.158 Researchers have 
noted a marked diﬀerence in emotional expressivity between extroverts and introverts. Extroverts 
have been shown to be more emotionally expressive, and in a study by Buck, Miller and Caul 
eﬀective emotional senders were identified as having a set of characteristics in common which set 
them apart from poor emotional senders. Compellingly, whilst having a rich emotional language 
and expressive faces, they were not found to have strong internal aﬀection of the chosen stimuli 
(pictures of happy children, burned and disfigured bodies etcetera). This was measured by heart 
rate and electro-dermal responses. Introverts, or poor emotional senders, on the other hand were 
unwilling or unable to show how they were being aﬀected by the images, but heart rate and 
dermal responses showed a powerful embodied reaction to the slides.159 I note that what seems 
to have been most highly valued by the researchers in 1974 (eﬀective sender versus poor sender) 
is perhaps an indication to the low status of empathy at the time.
155.   James Laird “The Real Role of Facial Response in the Experience of Emotion.” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 47 (1984), 480.
156.  Hatfield, Cacioppo and Rapson, 97.
157.  Ibid., 38.
158.  Ibid., 55.
159.  Buck, Miller and Caul quoted in Hatfield and Cacioppo, 107.
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I will move forward in time, but stay in the field of social psychology. Elaine Hatfield, John 
Cacioppo and Richard Rapson have more recently attempted to map out individual diﬀerences 
in regards to emotional contagion. They made the following statements about individuals likely 
to be aﬄicted by emotional contagion:
	 Rivet their attention on others 
	 Construe themselves in terms of their interrelatedness to others
	 Are able to read each other’s emotional expressions, voices, gestures, and postures
	 Tend to mimic facial, vocal and postural expressions
	 Are emotionally reactive160 
For me it resonates as a more accurate description than the generic term ‘introvert’, as social 
behaviour indicating introversion or extroversion in a popular psychology sense to me seems 
highly socially constructed, and certainly not measurable by how talkative or socially adept 
someone is. Again, like Buck, Miller and Caul they propose that diﬀerent people have diﬀering 
ability to infect others with their feelings. What they term Typhoid Marys possess a natural 
tendency to infect others with their moods and emotional states, while others, whom they 
term the Marcel Prousts (or Baudelaires, to my mind), are especially vulnerable to emotional 
contagion.161 
If I try to translate this to portrait photography, the Typhoid Marys of the photography world 
can be represented by a photographer like Richard Avedon, known for his bullish attitude 
towards his subjects. He said:
A portrait photographer depends upon another person to complete his picture. The subject imagined, 
which in a sense is me, must be discovered in someone else willing to take part in a fiction he cannot 
possibly know about. My concerns are not his. We have separate ambitions for the image. His need to 
plead his case probably goes as deep as my need to plead mine, but the control is with me.162 
A very eloquent rendition of the dynamics at play where a Typhoid Mary photographer engages 
in a face-to-face encounter with his subject. In contrast with Avedon, I choose August Sander 
as my Proustian portrait photographer. His work speaks of great sensitivity towards his subjects, 
and his son has described the particular humility with which Sander engaged the subjects of his 
160.  Hatfield, Cacioppo and Rapson, 128.
161.   Ibid.
162.  Richard Avedon quoted in Richard Bolton, ed. The Contest of Meaning: Critical Histories of Photography. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1992), 267.
89
work, regardless of who they were or their social station.163 There is no uniform way that his 
subjects face the camera; rather, one gets a sense of the multitude of characters that make up 
humanity. Comparing Sander’s People of the 20th Century with Avedon’s In the American West, 
superficially projects with a common ground or methodology, the diﬀerence in my reactions to 
the various portraits is palpable. 
Most of Avedon’s subjects look either uncomfortable or defiant. They are diﬀerent subjectivities, 
but as I flick through the pages they start bleeding into one, common character. They begin to 
approach caricature. Sander’s work, on the other hand, gives me a sense of engagement, almost 
of love for humanity in all its multifaceted forms. The people portrayed communicate with me, 
the viewer, as individuals, with their own subjectivities. Some touch me more deeply than others. 
I feel a warmth in the look, that original exchange between photographer and subject that I now 
get to partake in. A warmth absent in the photographs by Avedon.164
Fig V    
Fig V  Left:  Richard Avedon, Boyd Fortin, 13 years old, 1983           
 Right: Richard Avedon, Jay Green, Grain Thresher, Idaho, 1983
163.   “August Sander - People of the 20th Century” directed by Reiner Holzemer. (Reiner Holzemer Film, 2002) 
164.   Am I free to choose how to approach my own subjects? Can I take on a Proustian role here, a Typhoid Mary 
approach there? If the research around mirror neurons and emotional contagion are right, then I am limited by 
my own personality in the way that I engage with the subjects in front of my camera. In addition, my personality 
probably influences the kind of work that resonates most deeply with me, so it will come as no surprise to you that I 
am not unlike the description above of people easily aﬀected by emotional contagion.
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Looking at the two images of Avedon’s above, I am struck by the similarity in facial expressions. 
Set jaws, lips pressed together, the subject is confronting the camera, facing it head on, sizing 
it up. The boy carrying the gutted snake holds it up in-between himself and the camera, and I 
wonder if it has been killed for the benefit of photographer, and in extension, for me, the viewer. 
I look at them as other, there in front of the camera, and both seem to have been caught on an 
inhalation. Breathing in air rather than exhaling/ingesting the emotions of the Typhoid Mary 
photographer who stands in front of them.
SANDER GOES HERE
Fig V1 
August Sander’s young farmers, then? Are their expressions not similar, too? No, for me there is a 
diﬀerence in how they look back at us, and I have always been caught by the look of the last man 
in particular. Turning his head back to look at the photographer and us, his eyes seem to pierce 
me, bear straight into me. I posit that the photographer/receiver, the Proustian practitioner, will 
easily pick up the emotions of the persons in front of the camera, and mirror their emotional 
content back at them, eﬀectively increasing whatever emotion happens to be present in the 
subject. This works as a densifying of the emotional content, where the back-and-forth face-
to-face encounter between subject and photographer is like cranking up the emotional stakes, 
as it were, making what was already present more concentrated. In the work of the Typhoid 
Mary photographer, on the other hand (characterized by feeling and expressing strong emotions 
and being relatively insensitive or unresponsive to those around them who are expressing other 
emotions)165, the expressions of the persons photographed will be more a reflection of their 
Fig VI August Sander, Jungbauern, 1914
165.  Hatfield, Cacioppo and Rapson, 130.
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own selves than anything else. There is nothing inherently wrong with that – to create a kind 
of self-portrait using the faces of others, like Avedon purports to do, can be an interesting and 
worthwhile artistic method. But it does not interest me as a working method, and I believe the 
emotional content of those images is less strong.
What about other portrait photographers? I remember seeing a large retrospective of Pieter 
Hugo’s work recently;166 walking around the vast exhibition space left me disconnected – as I 
was walking through a museum exhibit filled with disembodied objects. People were connected 
not because of who they were, but what. But come to think of it, that is not the problem. Rineke 
Djikstra, often hailed as the heir to Sander, can also at times pick subjects by virtue of what they 
are. But then, in the meeting, something seems to happen, so that in the resulting photographic 
portraits the individuals’ subjectivity always breaks through. Soldiers are not merely there to 
display the uniform they wear; if anything, what superficially might appear to be the most 
interesting about them is quickly supplanted by a feeling of being confronted with another 
existence. I think of Charles Fregér, who produces similar series to both Djikstra and Hugo, 
and again a collection of objects comes to mind. The subjects continue as figures, they don’t 
manage to transition from what to who. So when I, as a viewer, confront Hugo’s and Fregér’s 
photographic portraits, technically immaculate, shot with a similar camera and presented on a 
comparable scale to Djikstra’s work, my body remains mute. 
Fig VII
Fig VII Rineke Dijkstra, Vila Franca de Xira, Portugal, May 8, 1994
166.  At Fotografiska, a large private photography institution in Stockholm, 2014.
92
It does not vibrate, the embodied resonance in me is absent. It takes a Proustian, it seems, for 
that to happen.
When thinking of face-to-face interaction, emotional senders versus receivers, and what role 
the subject is given, performance artist Marina Abramovic’s work at the Museum of Modern 
Art, The Artist is Present, also comes to mind. During a daily performance lasting as long as the 
museum was open, the artist sat on a chair facing a spectator, at either end of a space measuring 
a few metres in diameter, with more museum visitors queuing up around the square, waiting 
for their chance to occupy the chair opposite the famous artist. Big softbox lights were set up in 
all four corners, generating perfect studio lighting. The artist never stood, took a toilet break or 
consumed any food or drink for as long as the museum was open. The spectators could choose 
freely how long they occupied the chair in front of the artist, with durations lasting between a 
few minutes and many hours. A photographer was always on hand, documenting both the artist’s 
and the spectators’ faces, as the meetings between the pairs were taking place.167 The resulting 
photographs were published on a dedicated MoMa-run Flickr page, and subsequently a book 
and a documentary were made. In all there was an emphasis on showing moments when the 
spectator-subjects looked sad or started crying when facing the countenance of Abramovic. 
Fig VIII
   
Fig VIII Top right: Marco Anelli, Day 3, Portrait 2, 93 min. Marina Abramovic: The Artist Is Present, 2010 
 Top left :Marco Anelli, Day 68, Portrait 15, 164 min. Marina Abramovic: The Artist Is Present,  2010 
 Bottom right: Marco Anelli, Day 70, Portrait 12, 28 min. Marina Abramovic: The Artist Is Presenent  
 2010 
 Bottom left: Marco Anelli, Day 68, Marina Abramovic, 420 min. Marina Abramovic: The Artist Is Present  
 2010
167.  I did not see the performance, nor have I been able to experience Abramovic’s work live elsewhere, so when I 
write about it here, I write about my encounter with the representation of the work rather than the work itself.
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What do these images signify? Is Marina Abramovic a strong emotional sender, thus able to 
infect the spectators with her sadness? Are the audience members who started to cry during the 
meetings more eﬀective at picking up emotional messages from Abramovic? Beginning to cry 
when her eyes well up with tears? Empathizing with the artist’s suﬀering, sitting still for eight 
hours, without breaks? I am conflicted. When looking through Marco Agnelli's documentation 
images on Flickr, I soon start to recognize some of the crying faces, sometimes because they are 
famous actors, other times because they keep reappearing, crying every time even though one can 
read that they stayed only a few minutes face to face with the artist. It makes me wonder if all the 
crying we see is proof of emotional contagion. Or is it simply another performer’s performance 
in front of camera and audience? A chance to act, to be seen, to have one’s image distributed in 
a variety of channels? 
It makes me remember a conversation I had with the acclaimed Swedish actress Cecilia Frode. 
She told me that the key to be able to emotionally aﬀect an audience in the theatre was to go up 
on stage and “bleed”.168 I tried to ask her what she meant, what she did exactly to make it happen. 
I tried to figure out if it corresponded to those very brief moments when I, as an audience of film, 
theatre or dance, feel deeply touched. Bela Tarr’s vulnerable old man, for instance. Was it related 
to facing the audience head-on? It’s often been in those moments that I have been engaged the 
most. We discussed back and forth, but no clear conclusion was to be had. But I think of density 
again. Of charge. I believe Marina Abramovic is able to both bleed for her audience, and create 
density and charge in the meeting (through a form of non-acting which nevertheless appears as 
acting to me). But for the subjects within her performances it entails leaving their subjectivity 
to one side. To submit. And it is precisely this submission that she demands in her audience that 
intensifies the performance. In the documentation of the work, on the other hand, a book filled 
with portraits, I am left empty. Is it to do with camera position vis-à-vis the documentation? Just 
like with my own experimentation, see below, I am left standing outside of the reverberating loop 
of eyes interlocking. And I am not drawn in. The face is simply a face. Something takes place 
between audience member and performer, but I am left outside. Not to ponder a moment of 
absorption à la Fried/Diderot, nor eyes reacting outwards towards me. 
168.  Conversation with Cecilia Frode, Stockholm 14 May 2013; my translation.
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This piece also reminds me of my original investigation undertaken as part of this PhD. 
It started with me filming the face-to-face encounter taking place during a photographic 
portraiture session with artist Åsa Johanneson and one of her subjects, Anna.169 I set 
up two video cameras, one recording the artist, the other the subject, and filmed their 
entire sitting, lasting about 30 minutes. I was interested in whether it was possible to 
follow transference taking place between the photographer and the subject, with the 
help of Ekman and Friesen’s Facial Action Coding System. It did not work – the set-up 
which wouldn’t interfere with Johanneson’s shot was at the wrong angle for a good video 
documentation, and I quickly realized I did not possess the necessary skills to make it 
work. I also wondered how I aﬀected the situation – the subject seemed quite fazed at not 
only being photographed but also filmed and analysed afterwards. I did not have a sense 
that intimacy or exchange happened, and Åsa was not happy with the resulting images.
But, as a follow-on from this, I set up something I thought could turn into a possible 
artwork investigating two people’s continuity and communicability with each other. I 
wanted to set it up in opposition to what Ernst van Alphen proposes in relation to the 
photographic portrait: “The portrayer proves his/her artistic originality by consolidating 
the self of the portrayed.”170  I was interested in exploring other ways 
of expressing intersubjectivity, without this attempt to ‘consolidate the self ’, instead 
providing that which is normally hidden in the portrait: the face-to-face interaction as a 
“simultaneous and reciprocal experience of time and space.”171  
I invited people who did not know each other to come into the studio and look at one 
another for an extended period of time, while I filmed their encounter. The resulting clips 
were meant to be projected on either side of a corner, so you could see the two individuals 
facing each other.  It was clear that transference of emotion was happening between the 
two individuals, even though in my experiment the emotions veered towards joy rather 
than sadness. Perhaps because no one in the exchange was a designated sender, loading the 
169.  Åsa Johannesson and Anna, RCA studios 22 October 2008.
170.  Van Alphern, 239
171.  Ibid.
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encounter with emotional weight. None of the participants was consciously trying to elicit 
a reaction from the other.172 
The end result felt like a loop too closed. We as audience were not invited in; we viewed 
the emotional transference taking place between others, but it did not seem to extend out 
to include us. I decided against making the work into a finished piece, and left the clips to 
languish unedited on one of my many hard drives. I needed to rethink both how to unpick 
what happens between photographer – subject – audience, and how to make artworks 
that explored my theoretical ideas, perhaps best embodied by Levinas’s proposition that the 
human face is “the source from which all meaning appears”.173
I will continue the investigation into the external manifestations of emotional empathy, and 
see if I can learn more about what happens in the meeting between photographer and subject, 
artwork and viewer. Whereas Hatfield, Cacioppo and Rapson are primarily concerned with 
emotional contagion, social psychologist Ulf Dimberg and his collaborators at the University 
of Uppsala have conducted a series of experiments that set out to show how emotional empathy 
is related to individual diﬀerences in regards to facial feedback.174 They have managed to prove 
that people with high (as compared to low) marks on the questionnaire measure of emotional 
empathy, QMEE,175 react both more strongly and more quickly when exposed to another person’s 
emotional display.176 
Highly empathic people are both better at identifying and correctly reading facial expressions.177 
Dimberg proposes that highly empathic people may also be more susceptible to the emotional 
content of the expressions, which would in turn create a more intense experience of the stimuli. 
Studies conducted in a lab setting have shown that “people scoring high in emotional empathy 
react in accordance with the emotional expression of other persons while people low in empathy 
172.  Gavin and Susie, RCA studios 14 November 2008.
173.  Levinas,  297.
174.  Per Andréasson and Ulf Dimberg. “Emotional Empathy and Facial Feedback.” Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 
32, no. 4 (December 2008), 215.
175.   There is currently no way to scientifically ‘measure’ empathy other than through a questionnaire, although 
it’s probable that soon tests will rely on fMRI scans, instead. This is likely to bring in a whole host of ethical 
considerations.
176.  Dimberg, Andréasson and Thunberg,. 26, citing Dimberg (1990), Lundquist and Dimberg (1995) and Sonny-
Borgström (2002)
177.  Riggio, Tucker and Coﬀaro (1989) cited by Dimberg, Andréasson and Thunberg, 27.
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do not”.178 He continues:
Emotional empathy is related to the capacity to react with facial reactions to happy and angry facial 
expressions and this ability is particularly evident for people high in emotional empathy. This superiority 
in facial reactions to facial stimuli is accompanied by a higher level of empathic accuracy as indicated by 
higher intensity of emotional ratings of the happy and angry facial expressions.179
Therefore, we can deduce that empathy is directly related to how (much) a person mirrors the 
expressions of the other, and people high in empathy will facially mirror to a larger degree 
than people with average to low empathy. This seems to be consistent with the neuroscientific 
findings on children and individuals with mirror-synaesthesia, as both being highly empathic 
and having overactive mirror neurons. Quite what the relationships between the outer and inner 
manifestations of mirroring are, however, have not yet been explored. 
Another question that has not been answered at this stage is whether the facial expressions of the 
‘empathic subject’ are in fact due to facial mirroring, or due to empathically feeling the sadness 
or joy of the other. In short, the mimicking might be more down to emotions, independent of a 
mirroring eﬀect. Perhaps it is a combination of response patterns that are put into play 
when one is faced with the face of another, both facial mimicking and an embodied, internal 
reaction, containing more or less emotional contagion depending on the personality of the 
receiver. With low empathic people we do not know yet which of the two abilities, or both, are 
diminished. Some research on autistic individuals shows that when faced with an image of a 
face, they simply look in the wrong place. When made to look at the most expressive areas of the 
human face, they too were able to correctly identify the emotion expressed.180 
Again many of the experiments have been conducted on test persons interacting with photographs 
rather than other people. The researchers have found that images of facial expressions spontaneously 
seem to mimic distinct facial reactions in the viewer, expressions that perfectly correspond to 
the emotional expressions of the faces depicted in the test material.181 This mimicking happens 
spontaneously and non-consciously, or, as Gallese would call it, in an embodied fashion, 
without the test person being conscious of the eﬀect. In accordance with Hatfield et al.’s results, 
emotional contagion was taking place, whereby the observers not only mimicked but also felt 
178.  Ibid., 29. See also Wisenfeld et al. (1984).
179.  Ibid., 30.
180.  Vittorio Gallese, “The Body in Aesthetic Experience: A Neuroscientific Perspective,” 2012. 
181.  Andréasson and Dimberg, 215.
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the emotions displayed in the photographs.182 In fact, it was enough for the subjects to imagine 
a happy, angry or sad situation for them to react with corresponding facial muscles.183 Hess and 
Blairy, on the other hand, conducted experiments in which the aim was to see if they would 
encounter facial mimicry and emotional contagion when using rather weak and perhaps even 
idiosyncratic dynamic facial expressions of emotions, like those we are likely to encounter in 
day-to-day life. They also wanted to investigate if mimicry automatically leads to emotional 
contagion, thus facilitating emotional recognition. They assert that evidence from Dimberg and 
Lundquist used images from Ekman and Friesman’s seminal 1976 book Pictures of Facial Aﬀect, a 
set of highly recognizable, even prototypical, facial expressions. Much more extreme than we are 
likely to encounter in real life. Hess and Blairy were not able to replicate the results of Dimberg, 
specifically finding no correlation between mimicry and emotional contagion.184 Other studies 
used moving image clips of politicians featured on news programmes and found that the amount 
of mimicry was modulated by the political standpoint of the observers. If they shared the politics, 
they mimicked more than if they held opposing beliefs.185 
But how does the diﬀerence between the experimental set-ups cited above, of using still versus 
moving images as stimuli, aﬀect their outcome? Previous research points to stills engendering 
more mimicking behaviour. (I have yet to see a meta study looking at this phenomenon in 
particular, so am simply basing this statement on my own readings of previous research.) 
Perhaps facial expressions in images are clearer in their emotional message than the rapidly 
changing faces encountered in reality or in most moving image clips. Does that mean that 
the audience of a still portrait as opposed to a moving image portrait mimic more, therefore 
experiencing more emotional contagion? My own view is that it is a very diﬀerent thing watching 
a talking, moving face and watching a quiet face simply facing the camera. In the latter case, 
the face tends not to move so much, and I believe the impact is similar to that of photographs. 
I am thinking of how director Ingmar Bergman relentlessly focused his camera on his main 
characters’ comparably still faces (particularly in the films Persona and Cries and Whispers) during 
182.  Ulf Dimberg, “Facial Reactions to Facial Expressions.” Psychophysiology 19, no. 6 (Nov. 1, 1982): 643–47.
183.  G. E. Schwartz, P. L. Fair, P. Salt, M. R. Mandel, and G. L. Klerman. “Facial Muscle Patterning to Aﬀective 
Imagery in Depressed and Nondepressed Subjects.” Science (New York, N.Y.) 192, no. 4238 (April 30, 1976): 489–
91.
184.  Ursula Hess, and Sylvie Blairy. “Facial Mimicry and Emotional Contagion to Dynamic Emotional Facial 
Expressions and Their Influence on Decoding Accuracy.” Internationall Journal of Psychophysiology 40 (2001): 
129–41.
185.  Ibid.
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almost unbearably long clips. Gilles Deleuze, writing of Bergman’s facial close-ups, claimed that 
the Swedish director was “enforcing a coalescence of the human face with the void.”186 Making 
us consider the fundamental emotional isolation of humans. Or, if we describe it in terms of 
neuroscience or emotional contagion, he created an embodied exchange between viewer and 
actors, making it all the more powerful as superfluous information was stripped away. (The 
scenery – ordinary facial movements – the actor’s body.) Hatfield et al. have identified an 
interesting incongruity:
People seem capable of mimicking others’ facial, vocal, and postural expressions with stunning rapidity,
and, consequently, are able to ‘feel themselves into’ others’ emotional lives to a surprising extent; 
however, they also seem oblivious to the importance of emotional contagion in social encounters, and 
unaware of how swiftly and completely they are able to track the expressions of others.187 
Willingly or unwillingly. What implication does this have for portrait photography? And for 
Abramovic’s The Artist is Present? Is it possible that skilful portrait photographers mimic facial 
expressions and postures of their sitters as a way of eliciting the desired result in the portrait 
photograph? Or, do they act more like senders, trying to get the sitters to mimic them for 
desired eﬀect? If actors can emotionally ‘bleed’ on command as a technique for engendering 
an empathetic reaction in the audience, why not Marina? Does the fact that it happens in an 
art gallery rather than on a theatre stage make me want more authenticity from the encounter? 
Would The Actress is Present have had the same eﬀect? 
Certain movements, like neurolinguistic programming, have tried to exploit the natural tendency 
for creating social cohesion and ties between people through facial mirroring – but it is unlikely 
that we are able to learn to mimic the process of emotional contagion consciously, as it happens 
so rapidly. The boxer Mohammad Ali, trained to be able to respond to the bodily movement of 
his opponents with incredible swiftness, could only manage at the very fastest a response rate 
of 190 milliseconds to spot a light and an added 40 milliseconds to initiate a response to it, 
when ordinary college students were found to be able to synchronize their movements within 21 
milliseconds – completely unconsciously.188 
186.  Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image. 1 edition. (Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 1986), 
105.
187.  Hatfield,  and Cacioppo and Rapson, 183. 
188.  M.R Davis, “Perceptual and Aﬀective Reverberation Components.” In A.B Goldstein & G.Y. Michaels (Eds) 
Empathy: Development, Training, and Consequences, 87. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1985.
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So what are the implications for my own practice? I keep revolving around the portrait and 
the desire to create an embodied connection between artwork and viewer. In the next part, I 
will describe three practice projects that all explicitly demand an empathic engagement from 
the audience. The first, Breathing Instrument, invokes a sense of human vulnerability through 
aﬀecting the audience’s own breathing patterns, inspired by my own struggles with asthma. For 
the second project, I decided to abolish the camera entirely, instead inviting the audience to meet 
the subjects directly through a performance piece. Finally, the last work, Merciful, Wonderful is an 
attempt at liberating Greece’s national icon from its prison, inside a recently erected church and 
hidden away under a deep layer of jewellery and gold. 
3.7 Practice IV, Breathing Instrument
HDV loop, 2 minutes, wall-mounted 19"  vertical LED screen in eyeheight, headphones
The moving image loop Breathing Instrument focuses on a tuba player from the Royal Philharmonic 
Orchestra. The musician sits in a darkened space with his tuba on his lap, but, rather than play 
on his instrument, he laboriously breathes through it, drawing air in and out with great eﬀort. 
The work alludes to the mysteries of surface and depth, exteriority and interiority. 
The image and sound of this classical instrument are subverted, as if it is a kind of externalized 
bodily organ, revealing the primordial that is always present but often forgotten. When listening, 
one automatically attempts to sync one’s own breathing with the in- and out-breaths on the 
soundtrack, amplified by the tuba and drawn with great eﬀort. One feels out of breath, as if 
about to faint, yet at the same time connected to the meditative, trancelike mood of the depicted 
man. 
The work is installed on a wall-hung vertical  LCD screen, with adjoining headphones for the 
sound. The use of headphones rather than speakers was meant to intermingle the audience’s 
internal sounds with the musician’s breath. The work has been shown both with a large LCD 
screen and a smaller screen, measuring 19 inches in height. When originally concieved I wanted 
the tuba player to be as near to life-sized as possible, as I was under the impression that this 
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would incerase the sense of bodily mirroring and discomfort in the audience. After the first 
exhibition, however, I realised that it did not need to be large to have eﬀect - in fact, a smaller 
screen mounted at eye-height made the viewer move forwards, increasing the intimacy of the 
experience. 
 
With this work, I experimened with how to create or enhance an embodied connection to the 
artwork. Syncing breathing rhythms is something we do without reflecting on it when close to 
another person, but in this work the element of discomfort is there to make us conscious of it 
happening. It directly relates to my readings around mirror neurons - but rather than focussing 
on that elusive link between the interior lives of audience and artworks, I focussed on the body, 
the physical link, as a means of loading the work with psychological content. I also wanted to 
play with the idea of externalizing our insides, what we can see and cannot see. Is it possible to 
prolong the moment of embodied connection through using a static moving image clip rather 
than a still photograph? Do the use of moving rather than still images bring the work nearer to 
the unmediated meeting? In the next project I decided to remove the lens in order to further 
explore the embodied interaction between audience and artwork. 
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3.8 Practice V, Det Ordnar Sig Nog
Performance, duration 30 minutes occuring every 30 minutes over 2 days.189 
“Det ordnar sig nog” is a phrase from the 1970s Swedish play Hemmet (The Home), by Kent 
Andersson. I appropriated a moment of heightened connection between a theatre audience and 
an actor and re-contextualized it within the exhibition space. The performers are drawn from the 
amateur Blackebergs Senior Acting Club,190 and I asked them to improvise on the two phrases, 
which relate to fears of old age, illness and death. I was interested in exploring what would 
happen if I removed the lens, and let the audience experience the action, or moment, live. As 
opposed to experiencing a whole play, I wanted to remove the narrative and in this way isolate a 
moment in time, much in the same way as the camera does. Would it still be possible to retain 
the tension in the experience? Would the performers manage to aﬀect the audience?
During the performance of this piece, the door of the performance space was closed, and a sign 
on the door informed the audience the times that they were able to open it, and that they were 
welcome to enter or exit at any time. They were neither asked to interact with the performers, 
nor told to refrain from doing so. When opening the door,  five elderly people could be seen 
in a white room, with white semi-transluscent curtains, sitting down or walking around while 
repeating the phrases “Det ordnar sig nog” (It will be OK, hopefully) and “Det går inte” (It doesn’t 
work). The performers were told to use the entire floor space - to sit down on any of the 5 chairs 
in the room if they needed a rest - and interact with the audience if the occasion arose. 
The audience walked into the room, and experienced the shifting mood of the performers, 
whether they understood Swedish or not. The performers, not being professional actors but an 
ordinary group of ordinary people wearing ordinary clothes, acting out feelings we are not used 
to seeing expressed (particularly not in Sweden), loaded the empathic meeting between audience 
and performers. Perhaps the element of surprise when walking into the space and seeing the 
group of elderly people dressed in beige helped charge the situation - as if they had walked into 
189.  Funded by and performed at IASPIS, Stockholm, October 2009.
190.  A suburb of Stockholm, Sweden.
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an entirely diﬀerent reality. 
This performance came about at a particularly diﬃcult moment in my personal life, and I was 
interested in making the conflicting voices in my head manifest. I had remained professional 
and committed during the length of the residency,191 hiding my troubles from those surrounding 
me. But hearing the conflicting feelings  I had secretly struggled with echo around the walls of 
the Swedish Arts Council made me feel surprisingly exhilarated. And did it work, this attempt 
at removing the lens? Did an embodied meeting take place? It makes me think back to what 
Gallese termed "liberated embodied simulation"192 whereby we are able to leave our defensive 
mechanisms behind when viewing artworks. I don't think anyone in the audience felt they were 
able to do that when entering the performance space. Rather than the densification occuring 
between artwork and viewer, a sense of immediacy took its place. 
Two video cameras mounted on the walls recorded the duration of the performance, one on 
either side of the space, as I wanted the audience to also be part of the documentation. Here, 
on the other hand, I was disappointed. Much had been lost in the translation between direct 
encounter and represented encounter. The work existed only in the moment of the performance. 
Once it was confined to the screen, it did not manage to hold my attention or create an embodied 
connection with me. But then I had a conversation with someone who had not been there for the 
performance, instead only seeing the documentation, a simultaneous split screen shot from two 
diﬀerent angles. For him the work was still there; still loaded. Empathy and engagement felt. So 
maybe in this instance it was my own memory of the experience that made me unable to assess 
the documentation for what it was. The same can happen with photographs – but it’s not often 
so for me. I usually know quite well what I will have caught on film and seldom get surprised 
or disappointed. That does not mean I am always happy with what I do – simply that I tend to 
know if I managed to ‘get it’ or not. 
191.  1st April until 30th September 2009, At IASPIS, the Swedish Arts Council's residency programme in  
 Stockholm, Sweden 
192 See page 76 of this thesis, and Gallese 2012
105
3.9 Practice VI, Merciful, Wonderful (in collaboration with Loukia Alavanou)193
Single screen HD projection, 5,20 minutes
In the 1820s, during the Greek revolution, Mary repeatedly appeared to a nun residing on 
the Greek island of Tinos, asking for her lost portrait, allegedly painted by the apostle Luke, 
to be unearthed. The Maria Icon of Tinos was subsequently found in a field, and has since 
been receiving large numbers of pilgrims. The enduring fascination of the Icon is centred on its 
unavailability – soon after its discovery it was completely covered by a dense layer of oﬀerings: 
gold, jewellery and precious stones. This covering up with jewellery can be seen as creating a sort 
of extra surface in front of the image, a skin which is never removed.
Despite being completely hidden, the Icon is said to have a miraculous influence on thousands 
of lives. Even today, valuable objects and so-called tamas (silver oﬀerings depicting body parts 
or objects representing the wishes of the pilgrims) are deposited beside the Icon, in exchange for 
the promise of a wish fulfilled. 
Concealed behind precious gems, the Icon is marked with an absence that becomes the 
presentation of an unpresentable thing. Is part of the Icon’s seductive qualities the fact that 
this gap creates confusion, turning the Icon into a spectral object, like a ghost? We attempt to 
articulate this void by making a metaphor between the skin of the Icon and the skin of cinema, 
exploring what lies beyond the surface through the cut within editing. We treat the cut both as 
a potential entry point to the void; and as an opportunity to fill it. A technique of intercutting 
diﬀerent filmic sources through montage in a way that can be likened to collage becomes a way 
of tearing apart the skin of the image/Icon, creating the “rend” that Georges Didi-Huberman 
speaks of, where possible alternative meanings can emerge.194 
193.  The work happened in response to a commission from the Swedish Institute in Athens, curated by Antoni-
os Bogdakis. I invited Loukia Alavanou, a Greek artist working primarily in animation, and a native of Tinos, to 
collaborate with me. For the purpose of this PhD, a rough mapping out of the division of labour: I did most of the 
camera and text work, and Alavanou the soundtrack. However, there were overlaps and cross-fertilizations taking 
place throughout the process. The editing was done in close collaboration. 
194.  We draw a parallel with what is happening in the wider Greek society today; the fragile surface of civilization 
has started rupturing, and previously hidden forces such as the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party emerge.
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We move between close haptic195 ‘insider’ images that push us out of cinema’s illusionary depth 
and invite our eyes to linger on the surface of the image, dissolving the boundaries between 
the beholder and the thing beheld, and objective views where the beholder is conceived of as 
discrete, as having solid borders. If objective images pull us into idealized space, haptic images 
help us feel the connectivity between ourselves, the image and its material support, and the world 
to which the image connects us. 
The soundtrack runs parallel to the images, and consists of sounds created in the studio. In this 
way, the soundtrack enables a narrative surge as we move from one genre to another. This use of 
sound is also a way of ‘making strange’, removing our filmed footage from the realm of the real 
and making other experiences possible. The sound enables a displacement, a shift from reality to 
fantasy. The video is divided into three distinct and clearly separated parts.196 It starts with text 
appearing, typed sentences with scribbles around them. The sentences are taken from accounts 
from the Nun Pelagia, and from Swedish feminist Fredrika Bremer who visited Tinos soon after 
the discovery of the Icon. 
The pencil scribbles change how we perceive the text. Rather than proclaiming to the viewer, 
they invite the viewer in, to take the place of the narrator, to feel the movement of the hand 
against the paper, to experience the materiality of the surface. Eraser marks and words being 
crossed out indicate a hesitation within the narration. It is not closed oﬀ and presented to the 
viewer as absolute. After the last sentence, where we can vaguely make out the sentence “she loves 
us” obliterated with frenetic pencil marks, the sound of a heartbeat appears as a tama of a hand, 
suspended from the church ceiling, slowly revolves. Short clips from the interior of the church, 
the covered Icon with believers praying, start appearing. These images, visually familiar to most 
Greeks as they are televised each year, are removed from the familiar through the exaggerated 
195.  For an description of haptic imagery, see Laura U. Marks, Touch: Sensuous Theory And Multisensory Media. 1 
edition. (Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2002) 
196. As Loukia is based in Athens, and I in Stockholm, we had 2 weeks together to work on the film edit, sepa-
rated by several months, and perhaps this is why the transitions between the sections seem somewhat brusque and 
unresolved. Another reason could be the failure of managing to merge our distinct art practices and find a common, 
unified language. As it is now, instead my slow, measured and empathic pace is combined with the more aggressive 
cutting techniques and sound design of Loukia in the middle section creating a rather jarring overall impression. 
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soundtrack, where priests are given the sound of wind-up toys, and a clip of the dispensing of 
bread is reversed, the pieces being instead taken from the penitents.197 
Spending time in the church around the annual pilgrimage while Greece was plunged in a deep 
economic crisis was an upsetting experience. Watching the mostly poor and mostly female 
believers approach the church on their hands and knees with the hope of curing their ill relatives, 
and seeing how hard-earned cash kept being deposited in one of the many money collection 
points throughout the church, jarred with tales of monks being flown to the US to be cured 
when they became ill; meeting the mother of a young child, scarred from his many cancer 
tumours, as she crawled towards the church, while I knew that my collaborator’s uncle, a monk, 
had been flown to the US at the expense of the church when he contracted cancer, left me with 
a bad taste in my mouth.
Our mocking of the priests was a way to release that feeling. It was a way of reclaiming power, 
particularly feminine power. The relationship between the monks and priests and the female 
believer was defined by power on behalf of the clergymen and by passivity and submissiveness 
from the female believers. Just as I, in my work, want my subjects to be the ones defining the 
encounter with me and my camera, so I wanted the pilgrims to regain power from the church 
and its rigid patriarchal structures.
The camera returns to the bejewelled box containing the Icon, travelling up and down in a 
close-up, as if searching. But suddenly the door of the box is slammed shut, and the clip jump-
cuts to an aquarium being broken by a sledgehammer, appropriated from The Seventh Continent 
by Michel Haneke.198 Clips of surfaces being broken and torn follow. Here, Didi-Huberman’s 
rend/the broken aquarium is followed by an entry into a dream-space, a space where other 
interpretations can emerge. The screen goes black for a moment, then is filled by a close-up of 
197.  I write this in the days after the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, thinking back to the opening of the show 
featuring this work in Athens, when we (and the institution) were worried about Golden Dawn hearing about our 
project and deciding to target it. Only weeks before, a theatre play had been attacked. I feel fortunate to be able to 
critize and even mock religious ceremonies and practices that I find disturbing and negative. 
198.  Haneke, Michael. Seventh Continent. Kino Video, 2006.
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face. On the soundtrack, priests can be heard chanting, interspersed with gunfire sounding in 
time with the blinking eyes of the face.
With this face we tried to create a transcendent moment, where Mary, if you like, has been 
liberated from her cover once more, and is allowed to flow out and interact with us. The face 
keeps looking at the camera, unflinchingly meeting our gaze, reaching out towards us in its 
humanity. We feel the empathy the man has for us, and we for him, as we reach out towards each 
other in the meeting. The face-to-face interaction resolves the tension in the earlier sections, and 
points towards a position of forgiveness and reconciliation.
Whose is this face, you may want to ask, what is the story? For us it was of no importance. 
I filmed him very early in the morning, as he had just woken up in the courtyard of the church, 
where many of the pilgrims slept. We could not talk; we did not have a shared language. The 
only thing we had was our bodies: gestures and faces communicating with each other. I filmed 
him for some minutes, then our meeting was over. Six months later I received an email from 
someone who had seen the exhibition in Athens. Its subject heading was “A friend of yours” 
and it contained a mobile phone snap of the man, whom she had encountered on the streets 
of Athens. It turned out the man had been a seaman but now worked as a cleaner in a brothel. 
A man whom most of the Greek audience who saw the piece interpreted as a woman. Mary 
incarnate.
Finally, in this work many ideas of how we interact with images were tried out. Shots of tearing, 
smashing, scraping were all included with the intent of evoking a bodily resonance in the 
spectator, and the marks of the scribbling pencil across and around the printed text in the first 
sections connect the audience to the marks on the screen in an embodied relation. But in the 
end, what really worked amidst this cacaphony of clips and sounds and text was the face of the 
other, the old man facing the camera in stillness. So I return to the portrait, to the other looking 
back at me. To hear what he says to me. I don't know him, I can't know what he is thinking. He 
is other. The only thing I can do is look. 
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Conclusion
Every picture is an increase of being.199
    Hans-Georg Gadamer
We continually project the body into the world in order that its image might return to us: onto the other the mirror, 
the animal, and the machine, and onto the artistic image.200 
      Susan Stewart
I think of photography, and I think of empathy. Photography is a technique that has since 
its invention been used as a tool to capture the contained – gain access to the interior lives of 
others, and in the process perhaps find out more about ourselves. Photographic portraits have 
been scrutinized, and certain master photographers have claimed to be able to represent the 
other with 'unconditional veracity'. Although these ideas have been thoroughly discredited by 
postmodernism and artists like Thomas Ruﬀ, we are still fascinated by photographic portraiture, 
and photographically reproduced faces are ever-present in popular culture and on film. What 
precisely is it that so holds us/draws us in with photographed faces? A recent debate in The 
Guardian comes to mind, where, as a result of art critic Jonathan Jones polemically denouncing 
photography’s status as art, another of the paper’s art writers, Sean O’Hagan, came to its rescue. 
Underneath a headline proclaiming “Photography is Art and Always Will Be” – a striking close-
up portrait of Samuel Beckett shot by Jane Bown.201 Why would O’Hagan choose a portrait 
photograph, taken as part of a newspaper assignment, to be the first example, rather than a work 
from the ‘high cannon’ of contemporary art using photography?
Let’s look more closely at the image in question. Jane Bown has said that her meeting with Beckett 
was very brief, and indeed she preferred short encounters with her subjects. When describing her 
feelings relating to these meetings, she talked about how she would, during the short duration 
199.  Hans-Georg Gadamer quoted in Joanna Woodall, Portraiture: Facing the Subject (Manchester University Press, 
1997), 240. 
200.  Stewart p. 125
201.  “Sean O’Hagan on Photography | Art and Design.” The Guardian, December 13, 2014. http://www.
theguardian.com/artanddesign/series/sean-o-hagan-on-photography.
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of her looking at someone through the lens of her camera, “feel an intense love for them.”202 
As I write this, Samuel Beckett’s eyes stare out at me from my computer screen, and it is as if 
I, for a second, get a chance to meet him, too. Something happens in me. I am not unmoved. 
Perhaps the question has been asked wrongly. Perhaps rather than asking ourselves, What can I 
know of the other by observing his portrait?, we should ask ourselves simply – how does seeing 
this face make me feel? (I was interested to read, in one of the many articles appearing about 
Jane Bown when she passed away recently, that according to a colleague she claimed to be able to 
read people’s character in their faces. The same colleague said that, although he argued with her 
about this, he had to concede that she was often right.203 Why do I find this compelling and not 
simply an archaic throwback to discredited physiognomic ideas? Because she might have read the 
character less by looking at, and judging, the features of the person’s face, and more by being in 
tune with her own embodied reaction to her meeting others. How they made her feel.
Fig IX
Over the past few decades a common trope among photographers focusing on depicting faces 
has been to use strategies to disable the subjects’ self-presentation. In Bettina Zwehl’s Alina, the 
subjects are surprised by the flash of the camera whilst sitting in a dark room listening to Arvo 
Pärt’s music. Here, no interaction with camera or photographer is possible. But what do those 
images evoke in us? What is recorded is the non-meeting, but as a result it is diﬃcult for me, as 
audience, to encounter the subject. The images become artefacts similar to a scientific collection, 
but they do not subvert the rules, reach out and touch me. 
Fig IX Jane Bown, Samuel Beckett 1976
202.  Luke Dodd, “Jane Bown: Turning the Lens on Britain’s Shyest Photographer.” The Guardian, December 14, 
2014. http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2014/apr/24/jane-bown-observer-photographer-luke-dodd.
203.  “Jane Bown Remembered: ‘We Had Fun, Didn’t We?’.” The Guardian, January 9, 2015. http://www.
theguardian.com/artanddesign/2014/dec/28/jane-bown-remembered-obit.
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Their scope is limited, and they do not hold sway over me. I may get a voyeuristic pleasure from 
seeing a ‘hidden’ moment, but I do not engage intersubjectively with the subjects.
Fig X 
Another common strategy employed by portrait photographers centres around the eternal 
photographic desire to catch “the gap between intention and eﬀect”204, as Diane Arbus famously 
defined her working method. A goal one encounters again and again in articles and books about 
photographers mining their fellow humans’ countenances for their work. German artist Albert 
Tubke, for instance, has declared that his interest lies in “the big gap between what my subjects 
think they are and what is finally visible”.205 Rineke Djikstra, probably the most famous portrait 
photographer working today, also picked up on the idea, saying that her work aimed to “strike 
the balance between what people want to show, and what they show in spite of themselves.”206 
The photographer as a manipulator, then, calling forth that which we wish to keep hiding. This 
implies an unspoken but unequal power relation between subject and photographer, where the 
latter operates in collusion with the audience.207
Fig X  Bettina von Zwehl, Alina, 2004
204.  Diane Arbus and Doon Arbus. Diane Arbus: An Aperture Monograph. Special edition edition. (New York: 
London: Aperture, 2012), 2.
205.  Benedict Burbridge, “Exacting Photography: Self-Imaging and Its Frustration in Contemporary Art 
Photography.” Re.bus, no. 5 (summer 2010). http://www.essex.ac.uk/arthistory/research/pdfs/rebus_issue_5/
Burbridge.pdf. 
206.  Sara Douglas, “The Gap between Intention and Eﬀect.” Flash Art 36, no. 232 (October 2003): 79.
207.  In contrast to how Ariella Azoulay describes the encounter between photographer and photographed as a site 
of encounter leaving traces of both parties in the resulting photograph, traces neither party can control. 
Azoulay, Ariella. The Civil Contract of Photography. New York : Cambridge, Mass: Zone Books, 2012.
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Art historian Michael Fried, in his recent book on Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before, 
posits that “the portrait calls for exhibiting a subject, the sitter, to the public gaze; put another 
way, the basic action depicted in a portrait is the sitter’s presentation of himself or herself to be 
beheld.”208 He seems to be of the view that a portrait, to be interesting, should be able to show 
us some truth about the sitters, and that, for instance, Thomas Struth’s long-lasting relationships 
with the families he photographed as part of his Family Portrait series make the 
work more successful, and granted it emotional access to the sitters. I would argue that neither 
the gap between intention and eﬀect nor a long relationship between subject and photographer 
has anything to do with loading the images with emotional content. Let’s return to August 
Sander. When looking at the multitude of subjects in front of his camera, found in a variety of 
situations and settings, inside and outside, we are not prompted to draw easy conclusions about 
them. Rather, as Goldman writes, “the subjects are left in control of their faces; history may 
interfere, but Sander does not”.209 Where in Diane Arbus’s (and many others’) portraiture work 
the same emotional tone pervades the entire oeuvre, in August Sander’s each subject is invited to 
hold his own humanity; to reach out towards us and meet us with his subjectivity.
We reveal ourselves when facing others, in the meeting with others. When we set up a series of 
conditions with the goal of removing the subject’s conscious control, like the aforementioned 
project, I would argue that we do not understand what a photographic portrait can do, and how 
it does it. So, if my goal has been to free photographic portraiture from its history and its 
traditions, in a sense, I believe it has the potential to become a place where new significations can 
take place, where we can encounter ourselves through our interaction with the other.
And how can this happen? The evidence on emotional contagion and facial feedback is 
contradictory. And so is bringing psychoanalytic theories into dialogue with neuroscience as a 
way of oﬀering new perspectives on the meeting between photographer and subject. What we 
know of the mind-brain-body  is  nowhere near being resolved, and neuroscience is commonly 
accused of being naive and simplistic by psycoanalysts. Darian Leader goes as far as disclaiming 
208.  Michael Fried, Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before. 1 edition, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2008), 192.
209.  Judith Goldman, “Diane Arbus: The Gap between Intention and Eﬀect.” Art Journal 34, no. 1 (October 1, 
1974), 33. 
114
the importance of mirror neurons "if such a thing exists."210 But it does seem that people more 
prone to emotional contagion mirror others’ facial reactions more, are more emotionally aﬀected 
by others’ emotional states, and are less prone to flood a meeting with another with their own 
emotions. Perhaps it could be that portrait photographers who are consistently able to generate 
work that touches us are more likely to be emotional receivers who will strongly mirror their 
subjects.  I speculate that people who have strong situated reactions to photographic portraiture 
also have a higher susceptibility to emotional contagion. According to Gallese and Freedman, 
“the artwork becomes the mediator of the motor and emotional resonance arising between the 
artist and observer.”211 It makes the beholder feel that which is beheld in an embodied, non-verbal 
and non-conscious manner. In this way, embodied simulation plays a vital role in our interest 
and appreciation of art and portraiture. 
My own practice has been driven by a movement around the photographic portrait. I have 
taken a cue from Baudelaire, and used my own body and emotions as a sounding board, helping 
me define how and where moments of enhanced connection with others and with the world 
appear. Text, and the process of writing, emerged as a complementary tool in describing my 
interconnectedness with my surroundings. A series of experiments have been brought together, 
containing both successes and failures, reflecting on the most important working method, an 
open-endedness in terms of formal considerations. For me, it is counter-intuitive to hold the 
practice down in rigidly set rules, and I have thus welcomed moments of rebellion and digression. 
The works are presented as a series of distinct text and image works, using both still and moving 
images, and together they propose to bridge, or mediate, the distance between ourselves and 
others. To articulate our encounter – and our separateness.
210.  Panel Discussion, The Brain and the Mind - Discussion 3 of 6 , The Workings of Empathy, Tuesday 4th Decem-
ber 2012, Edmond J. Safra Lecture Theatre, Strand Campus, King's College London, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=VF7hG0S1dAw
211.  Gallese Vittorio: “From Mirror Neurons to Embodied Simulation” Part 1, 2012. Lecture at the Arnold Pfeﬀer 
Centre for Neuropsychoanalysis at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute
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What do I define as a suitable ambition for the portrait, then – my own and those of others? It is 
to create the kind of work where the power relationship fades into the background, and empathy, 
intersubjectivity, is allowed to take the front seat. Where the photographer renounces his or her 
upper hand (in having the control over when to release the camera shutter)212 and opens him or 
herself up to the non-verbal intersubjective meeting, and lets us, the viewer, feel the embodied 
connection with the other. And whilst I do not believe it is possible to completely avoid any kind 
of power relations aﬀecting the meeting between photographer and subject, I do believe that it is 
possible to be still and listen to those that are quiet - and try not to dominate the encounter. 
212. I am thinking of Richard Avdeon describing his encounters with his subjects , see page 82 of this thesis and 
Bolton p 267. 
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Additional Materials
DVD containing moving image projects:
51.  A Place to Call Home, miniDV film, 11 min, 2007   
60.  Down,  HVD loop, 8 min, 2008     
 
95.   Breathing Instrument, HDV loop, 2 min, 2008   
98.   Det ordnar sig nog, Efter Kent Andersson, Performance documentation,  2009  
103.   Merciful, Wonderful, Single screen HD installation, 5.20 min, 2013 
       in collaboration with Loukia Alavanou
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